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Abstract 
The ability to deliberately acquire information and skills in preparation for the future is 
crucial for the development of expertise, allowing one to choose what to invest time in learning and 
to intentionally shape one’s future self.  Despite considerable implications for children’s success in 
schooling and extracurricular endeavours, very little is known about how children develop this 
capacity to learn with the future in mind. The aim in this thesis was to begin bridging this gap in the 
literature by exploring the early development of children’s future-oriented information seeking and 
deliberate practice.   
In Chapter 2, I examined age-related differences in 4- to 7-year-olds’ capacity to 
spontaneously seek information beneficial to their future selves.  I adapted a paradigm used in 
selective attention studies to measure whether children would selectively attend to information that 
had a future purpose over information that had no future purpose.  I also measured whether children 
would use mnemonic strategies, such as verbal rehearsal and self-testing, to learn the relevant 
information in preparation for a future event.  I found that 6- and 7-year-olds, but not 4- and 5-year-
olds spent significantly longer attending to the information with a future purpose than irrelevant 
information and that the number of children using mnemonic strategies increased with age. 
Chapter 3 explored 4- to 7-year-olds’ understanding of deliberate practice and their capacity 
to engage in this in preparation for a future event.  I measured whether children would use an 
opportunity to selectively practise a skill in one room that would later become useful in a different 
room.  Six- and 7-year-olds demonstrated both an explicit understanding of deliberate practice and 
the capacity to selectively practise for the future without prompting, 5-year-olds showed an 
understanding of practice and some capacity to practise for the future, whereas 4-year-olds showed 
neither of these capacities.   
Chapter 4 explored the role of affective forecasting in motivating deliberate practice.  
Specifically, I measured the extent to which prompting 6- to 9-year-olds to consider how they 
would feel about achieving success in the near future would increase the time they spent practising 
to achieve that future success.  I demonstrated that prompting children to consider their future 
feelings motivated 8- to 9-year-olds, but not younger children, to practise longer.   
In Chapter 5, I conclude with a general discussion summarising the empirical findings and 
discussing implications for children’s self-regulated learning and episodic future thinking, and 
directions for future research. 
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Learning for the future: Children’s capacity to learn 
information and skills in preparation for a future event 
  2 
Humans have a remarkable capacity to envision and prepare for whatever the future might 
hold.  One crucial way we prepare ourselves to meet the demands of the future is by deliberately 
acquiring information, knowledge, or skills we anticipate will be useful to our future selves.  For 
example, when going for a job interview, we might anticipate we will need to know something 
about the company and undertake appropriate research before attending.  Similarly, we might 
practise our interviewing skills by rehearsing answers to potential questions.  We often dedicate 
time and resources to learning things for the future, even when doing so is costly in the short term.  
Many of us, for instance, devote several years extending our formal education for the sake of future 
careers.  This capacity to learn in preparation for the future offers our species important adaptive 
advantages.  Being able to deliberately and selectively acquire information and skills for the future 
allows us to take charge of our own learning and, in doing so, intentionally shape the strengths and 
capabilities of our future selves (Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016).  This capacity may account 
for the extraordinary diversity of human expertise that has contributed to the success and dominance 
of our species on this planet (Suddendorf et al., 2016). 
Developing the capacity to selectively learn for the future is critical to children’s success in 
schooling and extracurricular endeavours, as well as for the development of expertise in later life 
(Suddendorf et al., 2016).  It allows children to take the initiative in their education and training and 
make decisions about what they invest time in learning.  Despite the broad implications for their 
education, however, the development of children’s capacity to acquire information and skills for a 
future purpose has, until recently, been largely overlooked and little is known about when children 
start to self-initiate learning with the future in mind.  A better understanding of how this capacity 
develops is important for further insight into how children start to plan and prepare for the future 
independently, and how they start to regulate their own learning.  Therefore, the aim of my doctoral 
research was to begin bridging this gap in the literature by documenting the early development of 
children’s capacity to selectively acquire both information and skills in preparation for a future 
event and to investigate ways to foster this capacity.   
In this thesis, I refer to the acquisition of information for the future as future-oriented 
information seeking.  This behaviour involves selectively searching for or attending to information 
in order to learn it for future use.  Children may engage in this behaviour to study for a future test, 
for example.  I refer to the acquisition of skills for the future as deliberate practice.  Deliberate 
practice is the repetition of behaviours for the primary purpose of improving future performance 
(Suddendorf et al., 2016).  Deliberate practice has primarily been studied in the context of its role in 
the development of exceptional expertise in specialised domains such as music or athletic 
performance (e.g., Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Coughlan, Williams, McRobert, & Ford, 2014; 
Ericsson, 2008; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Hambrick et al., 2014; Macnamara, 
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Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014); however, it is also important for acquiring more ordinary levels of 
performance in everyday skills and behaviours, such as cooking or even learning to tie shoelaces 
(Suddendorf et al., 2016).  It is this essential capacity to acquire a range of skills for the future 
through repetition that we are interested in here. 
In this first chapter of the thesis, I discuss what we currently know about how these 
behaviours develop in early childhood, as well as what we have yet to learn.  I then consider how 
the development of these two behaviours may be supported by children’s developing capacity for 
episodic foresight and metacognition.  Finally, I detail the open research questions addressed in this 
thesis and outline the specific aims of the following experimental chapters. 
The Development of Future-Oriented Information Seeking 
Children actively seek information to learn about the world around them, even in the earliest 
years of life (Chouinard, Harris, & Maratsos, 2007; Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, 2009).  Even 
before they start speaking, children can recruit information from others using gestures and 
vocalisations (Chouinard et al., 2007), and with the onset of productive language, children begin to 
habitually question others about their environment (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  Preschool-aged 
children typically ask adults hundreds of questions per day (Chouinard et al., 2007) and can do so in 
a strategic manner that allows them to acquire relevant and reliable information that serves an 
immediate purpose or solves an immediate problem (Chouinard et al., 2007; Corriveau & Harris, 
2009; Greif, Kemler Nelson, Keil, & Gutierrez, 2006; Mills, Legare, Bills, & Mejias, 2010; Sobel & 
Corriveau, 2010).  For example, when asked to guess which of two items is hidden in a box, 4-year-
olds can generate appropriate questions and use the information gathered to solve the problem 
(Chouinard et al., 2007).  Overall, research demonstrates that even from a young age, children will 
seek out information with a purpose in mind when that purpose exists in the here and now. 
In contrast to what we know about children’s capacity to seek information for an immediate 
purpose, considerably less is known about when children will spontaneously seek information for 
the future.  In fact, to my knowledge, no published study has yet directly examined children’s 
capacity to do so.  However, one line of research that may offer insight into children’s future-
oriented information seeking is Miller and her colleagues’ work on children’s strategic information 
gathering (Miller, Haynes, DeMarie-Dreblow, & Woody-Ramsey, 1986; Miller, Seier, Probert, & 
Aloise, 1991; Miller & Weiss, 1981; Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988).  The researchers developed a 
selective attention task in which children were required to memorise the location of certain items 
hidden beneath doors for later recall in a future test.  Half of the doors covered items the children 
were told they needed to remember and would be tested on later, and the other half covered 
distractor items that the children would not be tested on.  The experimenters were interested in 
whether, during pre-test study time, children would preferentially look under the doors covering the 
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items they were told to remember while ignoring the doors covering the distractor items.  It was 
found that children as young as 4 years old learned over trials to spend more time looking under 
relevant doors than distractor doors (Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988).  This suggests that 
preschoolers are capable of selectively gathering information for a subsequent test, at least when 
explicitly instructed to remember specific information. 
Miller and her colleagues’ studies (Miller et al., 1986; Miller et al., 1991; Miller & Weiss, 
1981; Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988), however, were aimed at examining children’s selective 
attention rather than directly studying their future-directed information seeking.  Therefore, in their 
task, preschoolers were explicitly told which information they needed to remember for the test.  In 
other words, their task did not require children to think ahead about what information they should 
selectively gather for the future scenario.  Thus, it remains unclear at what point children develop 
the ability to spontaneously think ahead about information needed for a future event, and selectively 
seek the necessary information in preparation. 
The Development of Deliberate Practice 
Initial research into the development of deliberate practice has focused on children’s 
understanding of practice as a means of skill acquisition.  Through open interviews with 3- to 8-
year-olds examining their thoughts on learning, Pramling (1986) documented developments in 
children’s understanding of the role they play in their own learning and, specifically, children’s 
awareness that they could learn skills through deliberate practice.  Pramling asked children to report 
things they had learned, how they had learned them, and how they could improve performance, 
with these questions providing a starting point for open dialogue with the children.  She found that 
while most of the 3-year-olds failed to give responses that showed an understanding of learning, by 
age 4, most children understood that learning occurs through experience (i.e., one can learn through 
watching or doing).  However, initially, children conceptualised learning as something that 
“happens” to them, simply as a result of getting older or by doing something repetitively over time 
(incidental practice).  Only from age 6 onwards did most children’s responses indicate their 
awareness for the active role they play in their own learning.  For example, by age 6, children 
understood that they could deliberately practise skills and behaviours to learn them.  These findings 
suggest that it is not until age 6 that most children understand that they can deliberately control their 
own learning; thus, it may also be around this age that children begin to engage in deliberate 
practice.  Pramling did not, however, examine children’s deliberate practice behaviour.   
In a seminal study that utilised a behavioural task to examine children’s deliberate practice, 
Davis, Cullen, and Suddendorf (2016) first introduced 3- to 5-year-old children to four slightly 
different versions of a motor skill game that was designed to be initially difficult for children to 
play successfully, but which they would be able to master after a brief period of practice.  One of 
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the versions was highlighted to children as one they would win stickers for playing successfully in 
the near future (i.e., the target game).  Children were then taken to another room which contained 
replicas of the games from the first room.  Children were told they would be returning to the first 
room later and, without being explicitly told to practise, were asked to select which of the four 
versions of the game they would like to play in this second room.  After one minute of play with the 
game of their choice, children returned to the first room and were again asked to select a game to 
play.  It was expected that children with an understanding of deliberate practice would select to play 
the target game in both rooms.  This sequence was repeated two more times with two novel skill 
games.  The researchers found that the 4- and 5-year-olds, but not the 3-year-olds, selected to play 
the target game in both rooms more often than would be predicted by chance. 
Davis et al. (2016) also tested 4- and 5-year-olds’ explicit understanding of practice.  First, 
they asked who was most likely to win a competition out of someone who tried the target behaviour 
just once or one who tried the behaviour every day for an extended period.  Second, they asked 
children what they should do if they wanted to get better at something.  Four-year-olds did not 
perform above chance on the first measure, and only 10% said they would practise to get better at 
something.  In contrast, the 5-year-olds performed above chance on the first measure and over two-
thirds explained that they should practise if they wanted to get better at something.  The authors 
concluded that by age 5 most children have an explicit understanding of the link between deliberate 
practice and skill acquisition and can choose to practise a skill with the future in mind, suggesting 
this behaviour may appear earlier than the age identified by Pramling (1986). 
Although Davis et al. (2016) provided the initial insight into the age at which children first 
select to practise a skill for a future purpose, their study is not without its limitations. Namely, it is 
possible that children may have passed Davis et al.’s tasks without intentions to engage in practice 
or having an understanding of deliberate practice.  In their behavioural task, the experimenters did 
not measure the extent to which children actually practised the selected game, nor did they ask 
children why they had selected their chosen game.  Given this, for children who chose the target 
game, it is unclear if they did so with the intention to practise, or simply because it was the game 
that was initially highlighted to them as being associated with a reward.  Furthermore, children’s 
responses to the explicit verbal questions may not have been truly reflective of their understanding 
of deliberate practice.  Selecting the character who tried a behaviour many times over an extended 
period to win a competition requires only an understanding that learning occurs over time through 
experience.  In other words, it does not necessarily require an understanding that one can 
deliberately influence one’s future performance through practice.  The finding that the 5-year-olds 
in Davis et al.’s study passed this task aligns with Pramling’s (1986) finding that children have an 
understanding of learning through experience by this age.  
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Additionally, in response to the second verbal question (i.e., “What should you do to get 
better at something?”), children could have provided a correct answer simply through having 
formed associations between the words “practice” and “getting better” from being told this 
repeatedly.  In fact, immediately prior to being asked this question, children were told about a 
character who tried a behaviour many times to succeed in a future competition.  Thus, while 5-year-
olds may have a basic understanding of the importance of practice in learning, it remains unclear 
whether they understand the active role they play in learning skills and, importantly, if they 
spontaneously practise in preparation for the future.   
The Cognitive Capacities Supporting Learning for the Future 
Future-oriented information seeking and deliberate practice, while distinct behaviours, are 
likely to rely on similar underlying cognitive capacities (Suddendorf et al., 2016).  Whether it is 
information or skills that they need to learn for a future purpose, children must engage in four key 
cognitive processes to successfully engage in these learning behaviours.  First, children must 
envision a future scenario in which what they learn would be beneficial.  Second, they must 
recognise that they currently lack that information or skill.  Third, they must have an awareness of 
strategies they can use to deliberately acquire that information or skill.  Fourth, they must regulate 
their behaviour to enact those learning strategies in preparation for the future scenario.  Here, I 
argue that episodic foresight and metacognition are the key cognitive capacities that support the four 
key processes underlying children’s engagement in future-oriented information seeking and 
deliberate practice1. 
Episodic Foresight 
Episodic foresight is the capacity to mentally project oneself forward in time and regulate 
one’s behaviour accordingly (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Moore, 2011).  This 
capacity allows humans to imagine an infinite number of possible future scenarios, weigh up the 
likelihood and desirability of each scenario, anticipate the consequences of current action, foresee 
potential obstacles and challenges, and plan flexibly for alternative situations (Suddendorf, Addis, 
& Corballis, 2009).  Episodic foresight is crucial for the first process involved in future-directed 
                                                                 
1 Executive function—the range of processes that allow one to purposefully monitor and regulate 
one’s own thought and behaviour and to guide goal-directed behaviour (Beck, Schaefer, Pang, & 
Carlson, 2011; Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005; Carlson, Zelazo, & Faja, 2013)—is also clearly 
essential for children’s capacity to learn for the future; however, as it supports the development of 
both episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013) and 
metacognition (Bryce, Whitebread, & Szucs, 2015; Roebers, Cimeli, Rothlisberger, & 
Neuenschwander, 2012), in this thesis I will focus primarily on these latter two capacities. 
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learning, allowing children to envision a future scenario in which information and skills may be 
useful. 
Episodic foresight also plays a key role in facilitating future-oriented decision making.  Our 
ability to envision our future selves provides a unique motivation to choose to delay gratification 
and engage in future-oriented behaviours, countering a natural tendency to discount delayed 
rewards (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011).  There are a number of theories for why this is the case.  
Hoerl and McCormack (2016) proposed that episodic foresight may decrease the subjective 
temporal distance of future events, making them feel closer, as well as increase psychological 
connection with one’s future self, motivating us to care about our future needs, desires, and 
emotions (see also Prabhakar, Coughlin, & Ghetti, 2016; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  Boyer 
(2008) argued that episodic simulation of future events may provide a preview or “pre-experience” 
of the emotional consequences of future events, serving as an immediate reward (e.g., a feeling of 
anticipated pride) or punishment (e.g., anticipated regret) for a particular decision.  People often 
make decisions based on how they predict a future outcome will make them feel (Wilson and 
Gilbert, 2005)—we strive to attain goals we believe will make us happy and avoid outcomes we 
believe will make us unhappy—and there is convincing evidence that affective forecasting 
(predicting one’s future feelings) increases persistence in working towards a goal (Greitemeyer, 
2009).  Thus, the capacity to envision a future event and its affective consequences is thought to 
play a key role in driving effortful future-directed behaviours (process 4).   
Development.  Children first show signs of a capacity to envision and flexibly prepare for 
the future between ages 3 to 5 years.  Initial verbal studies show clear developments during this age 
in children’s ability to predict and talk about future events.  For example, Busby Grant and 
Suddendorf (2005) asked children to talk about something they will do tomorrow and found that, 
while some 3-year-olds could report an event that would occur tomorrow, significantly more 4- and 
5-year-olds were able to do so.  Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, and Tustin (2011), on the 
other hand, found that most 3-year-olds could discuss a future event when the event was generated 
for them, suggesting younger children struggle with self-generating future scenarios and may 
benefit from adult prompting to consider the future.  However, even with this prompting, 5-year-
olds still reported more total overall information about the future event than did 3-year-olds, 
suggesting there are improvements over the preschool years in children’s capacity to mentally 
represent future scenarios. 
Behavioural studies aimed at assessing children’s future-oriented thinking also show 
important developments during the preschool years in children’s ability to anticipate and prepare for 
the future.  Suddendorf and his colleagues developed an experimental design that assessed whether 
preschoolers could pre-emptively secure a solution to a future problem (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 
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2013; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011).  For example, 
Suddendorf and Busby introduced preschoolers to a problem without a solution in one room (a 
puzzle board that was missing its puzzle pieces) before taking children to a second room and, after a 
short period of unrelated activities, offering them a choice of one of four items to take back to the 
first room, one of the four items being the solution to the original problem (i.e., the puzzle pieces).  
The researchers were interested in whether children could recall the problem in the first room and, 
in anticipating returning to the problem, would select the puzzle pieces to take with them.  They 
found that 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, were more likely to select the puzzle pieces 
compared with control children who were not presented with an empty puzzle board in the first 
room.  Follow up studies have shown that, while 3-year-olds struggle at this type of task after even 
a short delay between presentation of the problem and presentation of the solution (Redshaw & 
Suddendorf, 2013; Scarf, Gross, Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf et al., 2011), 4-year-olds 
perform well even after delays of up to 1 week (Scarf et al., 2013; Suddendorf et al., 2011), as well 
as when there is a delay between the presentation of the solution and thec return to the problem 
(Scarf et al., 2013).  Overall, the results of both verbal and behaviour studies demonstrate 
significant developments in children’s episodic foresight capacity during the preschool years.   
A common element of most of these studies assessing preschoolers’ episodic foresight 
abilities, however, is that children are prompted by experimenters to think about the future, either 
through questioning or being forced to select an item from among distractors.  While these studies 
do provide important information about the emergence of children’s basic capacity to think about 
future scenarios, they do not assess children’s capacity to do so spontaneously.  The ability to 
spontaneously anticipate, consider, and plan for future scenarios in the absence of environmental 
cues prompting us to do so is, arguably, what is so adaptive about human episodic foresight.  For 
example, we need not be in a classroom or with a teacher to learn, but instead have voluntary 
control of what, where, when, and for how long we learn in preparation for the future (Rossano, 
2003).  Given the obvious implications for children’s success in schooling and extra-curricular 
endeavours, there is a need for further research into the development of children’s capacity to 
spontaneously consider and prepare for the future, and for ways we might foster this ability. 
Metcalf and Atance (2011) aimed to address this by developing a new paradigm to assess 
children’s capacity to spontaneously save for the future.  Children aged 3 to 5 years of age were 
introduced to two rooms, each containing a version of a game in which children could drop marbles 
down a run, after which they could not be used again.  The first room contained a small, less 
desirable marble game, and the second contained a larger, more desirable version.  Children were 
given three marbles to use across the two rooms and were told that no further marbles were 
available.  They were told they would be staying in the first room for 3 min and then in the second 
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room for 3 min.  The researchers did not tell children to save some marbles for use in the second 
room but were interested in whether children would do so spontaneously.  Results revealed that 
most children (61%) did not spontaneously save any marbles on the first trial and that older children 
did not save any more marbles than younger children.  However, perhaps after experiencing the 
disappointment of having no marbles for the more desirable marble game, children saved 
significantly more on the second trial, with approximately three-quarters of children saving at least 
one marble and, again, no age-related differences.  This suggests that, when given directly relevant 
experiences, preschoolers can learn and adjust their behaviour to benefit their future selves.  In a 
follow-up study, Atance, Metcalf, and Thiessen (2017) found that prompting 3- to 5-year-olds to 
consider saving marbles increased the number of marbles children kept, with prompted children 
saving on average 1.60 marbles out of the five available, compared to children in the spontaneous 
condition saving only 0.67 marbles for the future.  Overall, the results of these two studies suggest 
that, even by the end of the preschool period, children still struggle with spontaneous and on-going 
future-directed behavioural tasks. 
While much of the research on children’s episodic foresight to date has focused on the 
emergence of this capacity in the preschool period, recent research is starting to reveal the age-
related improvements in episodic foresight through middle childhood and, in some cases, into 
adolescence.  In particular, children’s ability to both generate future mental scenarios and imbue 
these scenarios with rich contextual details has been shown to increase gradually between 5 and 11 
years of age (Coughlin, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Coughlin, Robins, & Ghetti, 2017), and there are 
continued age-related improvements in the richness of imagined events through to at least ages 14 
to 16 years (Gott & Lah, 2014).  Furthermore, recent studies (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; Kramer, 
Goldfarb, Tashjian, & Lagattuta, 2017; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014) have revealed that 
affective and motivational aspects of episodic foresight, like the ability to accurately anticipate 
future desires and feelings, may be late developing.  For example, Mahy et al. found that 7-year-
olds performed no better than 3-year-olds at predicting a future desire that differed from a current 
one. Furthermore, Kramer et al. demonstrated that even adolescents and adults failed to do so 
accurately, at least when the currently experienced desire was a salient physiological need such as 
thirst.   
In summary, while it is clear that children have some capacity to think about and act for the 
future by the end of the preschool period, the extent to which preschoolers spontaneously and 
elaborately consider the future seems to be limited.  When it comes to learning for the future, 
previous research indicates preschoolers may struggle to spontaneously envision future scenarios in 
which information and skills are needed, and therefore do not anticipate the need to learn in 
preparation without adult prompting.  Furthermore, previous research suggests that preschoolers 
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have more success on foresight tasks relying on ‘cool’ reasoning processes rather than ‘hot’ 
affective or motivational processes (Mahy et al., 2014).  This difficulty in anticipating conflicting 
future desires and feelings may impact preschoolers’ capacity to self-motivate future-directed 
learning behaviours like information seeking and deliberate practice.  Therefore, the primary school 
years may be when children make strides in their capacity to spontaneously learn for the future. 
Metacognition    
Metacognition refers to the awareness and understanding of one’s own cognitive capacities 
and processes, and the use of this knowledge to monitor and regulate one’s cognitive processes on-
task (Flavell, 1979).  It plays a crucial role in self-directed learning (Boekaerts, 1996), allowing 
children to monitor their learning and reflect on what they currently know or can do and on what 
they have yet to learn (process 2).  Metacognition also supports children’s developing awareness of 
themselves as learners and of strategies they can use to deliberately learn information and skills 
(process 3).  Finally, metacognitive control processes allow children to flexibly enact these 
strategies in line with the feedback from monitoring processes (process 4).  
Development.  The preschool years are considered to be a time of important early 
developments in children’s metacognition.  It is during this time that children first develop an 
awareness of themselves as ‘thinkers’ and show a capacity to reflect upon their current knowledge 
states.  By the early preschool years, children begin to produce and comprehend language referring 
to mental states about knowledge, such as “think” and “know” (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Flavell, 
1999), and are reasonably accurate at judging whether or not they know something (Lyons & 
Ghetti, 2011; Marazita & Merriman, 2004).  For example, Marazita and Merriman found that 
children as young as 30 months old could reliably report that they did know the names of familiar 
objects and did not know the names of novel objects.   
Children’s capacity to monitor more subtle degrees of knowledge or skill states (i.e., 
knowing something a little bit vs knowing something well) continues to develop over the preschool 
and primary school years.  Preschoolers, for example, show a notorious tendency for 
overconfidence when asked to judge their own performance and abilities across a range of domains, 
including cognitive (e.g., Stipek, 1981; Yussen & Levy, 1975) and physical prowess (e.g., Plumert 
& Schwebel, 1997; Schneider, 1998).  Furthermore, this overconfidence persists even after children 
receive feedback on the inaccuracy of their predictions (Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009; Shin, 
Bjorklund, & Beck, 2007).  This overconfidence may be detrimental to children’s future-directed 
learning as they may be less likely to seek information or practise skills if they believe they already 
know what is needed.  Research shows, for example, that overconfident students inaccurately judge 
themselves as ready for a memory performance test and prematurely terminate study time to the 
detriment of their performance (Destan & Roebers, 2015; Dunlosky & Rawson, 2012; Metcalfe & 
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Finn, 2008; van Loon, de Bruin, van Gog, & van Merriënboer, 2013).  This overconfidence 
gradually decreases with age, and we continue to see age-related improvements over the primary 
school years (Howie & Roebers, 2007; Schneider, Visé, Lockl, & Nelson, 2000).  Even so, by 5 
years of age, children’s confidence judgments are beginning to be more accurately related to their 
performance (Destan, Hembacher, Ghetti, & Roebers, 2014), suggesting they are beginning to 
distinguish when they know something well compared with when they do not, and may be able to 
appraise their performance in a graded fashion. 
While there are rapid improvements over the preschool period in children’s capacity to 
monitor their knowledge and skill states, their ability to monitor how they acquire that knowledge 
or skill has a more protracted development. Young preschoolers appear to pay little attention to 
their own learning, often learning new things without being able to report how they learned it, even 
when asked immediately after the learning event.  For example, Gopnik and Graf (1988) revealed 
hidden contents of various drawers to preschoolers, either by showing them what was inside, 
directly telling them, or giving them a clue about the drawer’s contents.  While both 3- and 5-year-
olds could report what was in each drawer, only the 5-year-olds were able to report how they knew.  
Preschoolers also struggle to accurately judge when learning took place and 4- and 5-year-olds will 
report having known a novel piece of information for a long time, even immediately after learning it 
(Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994). 
Young children do, however, appear to have more awareness of learning when it is 
accompanied by changes in behaviour (e.g., new skills) rather than changes in knowledge states 
(Esbensen, Taylor, and Stoess, 1997).  Studies asking children to talk about things they have 
learned found that 2- to 7-year-olds are far more likely to report learning skills or behaviours than to 
report learning factual information (Bartsch, Horvath, & Estes, 2003; Pramling, 1988).  
Furthermore, Esbensen, Taylor, and Stoess showed that when 4- and 5-year-olds are taught new 
behaviours and new facts, they are more likely to report having just learned the new behaviour and 
having known the fact a long time, suggesting children initially conceive of learning as learning to 
do something and only later conceive of learning as learning to know something.  Additionally, 
Pramling (1986) found that while 8-year-olds were aware they could deliberately practise a skill to 
learn it faster, few understood that they could deliberately rehearse a phone number to learn it 
faster.  Children may develop an awareness of learning strategies for skill acquisition before they 
are aware of learning strategies allowing for information acquisition, because they find it easier to 
notice changes in behaviours, which can be observed physically, compared with changes in mental 
states, which are abstract. 
Finally, metacognitive control—one’s ability to flexibly adapt one’s behaviour in response 
to information garnered from monitoring processes—also appears to have a more protracted 
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development through middle childhood (for a review, see Schneider & Lockl, 2008).  
Metacognitive control is often examined through children’s allocation of study time.  While adults 
tend to allocate study time depending on the difficulty of the material being learned (e.g., Nelson, 
Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994), younger children typically allocate study time randomly, even 
despite being able to accurately distinguish easy-to-learn and difficult-to-learn information.  For 
example, Dufresne and Kobasigawa (1989) asked 6- to 12-year-olds to learn easy and difficult 
picture pairs and allowed them to self-pace their study time.  They found that the younger (6- to 8-
year-olds) children spent roughly the same amount of time studying the easy and difficult pairs, 
while the older (10- to 12-year-olds) children spent more time studying the difficult pairs compared 
with the easy pairs.  Similarly, Lockl and Schneider (2003) found that while both first graders (7-
year-olds) and third graders (9-year-olds) could differentiate between easy-to-learn and hard-to-
learn information, only the third graders reliably regulated their study behaviour in line with these 
judgements, spending more time studying the hard-to-learn and less well-known information (see 
also Metcalfe & Finn, 2013).  More recent studies suggest that metacognitive control processes may 
emerge even earlier than previously thought.  Destan et al. (2014), for example, showed that 
children as young as 6 years could allocate their study time based on the outcome of the 
metacognitive monitoring (see also Tsalas, Paulus, & Sodian, 2015).  There is, however, a 
consensus amongst researchers that metacognitive control processes appear later in development 
than monitoring processes. 
In summary, it is likely that, by the end of the preschool years, children have some 
awareness of what they know and can do and what they have yet to learn.  However, given 
documented difficulties in their capacity to recognise how and when they learned something, as 
well as an apparent lack of awareness of the active role they play in their own learning, preschoolers 
may not have sufficient understanding that they can deliberately seek out information or practise 
skills to learn them.  Finally, research suggests it is not until at least age 6 that children start to exert 
flexible control over their own learning, which is necessary for deliberate and selective information 
seeking and deliberate practice.  These conclusions align with those outlined in the above section on 
episodic foresight in suggesting that children’s capacity to learn for the future may not emerge until 
at least age 6. 
The Present Research 
Many fundamental questions about the development of children’s future-directed learning 
remain to be answered.  For instance, at what age do children start to seek out information they 
anticipate they will need in the future without adult prompting?  Similarly, at what age do children 
start to practise skills for a future event without adult prompting?  Do these two behaviours appear 
at roughly the same age due to their reliance on similar underlying cognitive capacities, or is there a 
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developmental asynchrony owing to children becoming aware of changes in behaviours and skills 
before changes in knowledge states?  Also, are there ways in which we can effectively foster future-
directed learning behaviours in children?  In this thesis, I aim to address these questions through 
three studies. 
The aim of Study 1 (presented in Chapter 2) was to examine 4- to 7-year-olds’ capacity to 
spontaneously seek information needed for a future event.  In this study, I presented children with a 
modified version of the selective attention task used in the research undertaken by Miller and 
colleagues’ (Miller et al., 1986; Miller et al., 1991; Miller & Weiss, 1981; Woody-Ramsey & 
Miller, 1988) on children’s strategic information gathering.  In this modified version, rather than 
telling children which information they needed to memorise, I highlighted select information as 
having a future purpose and instead allowed children to decide for themselves which information to 
spend time learning.  I measured how much time children spent learning the information with a 
future purpose compared to the information with no future purpose to examine the age at which 
children start to spontaneously guide their own behaviours to selectively seek information for the 
future. 
Study 2 (presented in Chapter 3) aimed to examine 4- to 7-year-olds’ understanding of 
deliberate practice and their capacity to selectively practise skills needed for a future event.  Using a 
modified version of Davis et al.’s (2016) deliberate practice paradigm, I examined whether children 
would dedicate time in one room to selectively practising a skill they would later be tested on in a 
different room.  This study aimed to address the limitations of Davis et al.’s initial study on 
children’s deliberate practice by allowing children to play with both the target game and distractor 
games during the practice time instead of forcing them to choose one, thereby also providing a 
measure of the extent to which children spontaneously practised for the future. 
Finally, Study 3 (presented in Chapter 4) aimed to examine whether prompting 6- to 9-year-
olds to consider their future feelings (affective forecasting) would motivate them to practise longer 
in preparation for a future event.  Affective forecasting is thought to motivate future-directed 
behaviours through facilitating connection with one’s future self (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015; 
Prabhakar et al., 2016; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).  A recent study with adults showed that 
experimentally manipulating affective forecasts can increase participants’ persistence when 
working towards a goal (Morewedge & Buechel, 2013).  This may, therefore, offer a promising 
means to foster children’s future-directed learning behaviours.  In Study 3, I test for the first time 
whether experimentally manipulating children’s affective forecasts can increase the time they spend 
engaged in deliberate practice.  I use the same deliberate practice paradigm used in Study 2, but this 
time prompting children to imagine how they would feel if they could successfully perform a skill 
in the future.  
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Preface 
The next three chapters report empirical studies examining children’s future-directed 
learning.  The current chapter presents the first empirical study of my doctoral research.  In this 
study, I used an adaptation of Miller and her colleagues’ (Miller, Haynes, DeMarie-Dreblow, & 
Woody-Ramsey, 1986; Miller, Seier, Probert, & Aloise, 1991; Miller & Weiss, 1981; Woody-
Ramsey & Miller, 1988) selective attention task to examine the age at which children first start to 
seek information for a future purpose without prompting.   
This study was submitted for publication1 after the publication of one of the experiments on 
children’s deliberate practice reported in Chapter 3, and this chapter, therefore, refers to some of 
these findings.  My co-author on this paper, Jonathan Redshaw, developed the study concept and 
design.  I collected all data, performed all data analyses and interpretation, and drafted the 
manuscript.  Jonathan Redshaw, Kana Imuta, Mark Nielsen, and Thomas Suddendorf provided 
critical revisions and feedback on the draft manuscript. 
 
1Brinums, M., Redshaw, J., Nielsen, M., Suddendorf, T., & Imuta, K. (submitted). Children’s 
capacity to seek information in preparation for a future event. 
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Abstract 
Despite a wealth of recent research examining children’s future-oriented cognition, there remains 
little known about the development of spontaneous information seeking behaviour aimed at 
achieving specific future goals.  Here we present the first experiment directly tracking the 
emergence of such behaviour in 4- to 7-year-old children.  We presented children (N = 121) with 
cards showing either target information that they were told had a future purpose or distractor 
information that they were told had no future purpose.  Without telling them which information to 
memorise, they were then given time to study the cards in preparation for a future event in which 
their knowledge of the target information was assessed.  We predicted children who were 
anticipating the future event would spend more time attending to target information than distractor 
information and would be more likely to spontaneously use proactive learning strategies such as 
verbal rehearsal and self-testing.  We found that 6- and 7-year-olds, but not 4- and 5-year-olds spent 
significantly more time attending to target cards than distractor cards.  While only a minority of 
children used proactive learning strategies, the number of children using them increased with age.  
We conclude that many children can selectively seek information for specific future episodes by at 
least age 6, and we discuss why this skill may emerge relatively late in development. 
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Young children’s capacity to seek information in preparation for a future event 
A defining feature of human cognition is our capacity to anticipate and prepare for the future 
(Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  One way we regularly do this is by 
seeking information we foresee as being important for our future selves (e.g., studying for a career).  
Humans can seek out information for an anticipated future even when it serves no immediate 
benefit and, together with our capacity to acquire skills through deliberate practice, this is a likely 
cornerstone of the extraordinary diversity in human expertise (Suddendorf, 2013).  Yet while this 
behaviour is ubiquitous in adult life, we know little about when children start to spontaneously seek 
information in anticipation of the future.  
Preschoolers will purposefully seek information needed to address problems at hand.  For 
example, when asked to guess which of two items is hidden in a box, 4-year-olds can generate 
appropriate questions and use the information gathered to solve the problem (Chouinard, Harris, & 
Maratsos, 2007).  Furthermore, when given explicit instructions on which information they need to 
remember for a future task, preschoolers can learn to strategically seek out the necessary 
information.  When asked to memorise the location of target items within an array of distractor 
items for a future test, children as young as 4 years will learn over trials to spend more time viewing 
target items than distractor items (Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988; see also Miller, Haynes, 
DeMarie-Dreblow, & Woody-Ramsey, 1986; Miller, Seier, Probert, & Aloise, 1991; Miller & 
Weiss, 1981).  However, to our knowledge, no study has examined when children will 
spontaneously think ahead (i.e., without explicit instructions to do so) about what information is 
needed for a future occasion and selectively acquire the necessary information in preparation.   
During the preschool years, children begin to show competence on a range of future-
oriented tasks (see Atance, 2015; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013 for reviews), such as predicting 
what they will do tomorrow (e.g., Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2005), providing details when asked 
about specific future events (e.g., Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011), saving 
items for later use (e.g., Atance, Metcalf, & Thiessen, 2017), selecting from among distractors an 
item that would be useful in future scenarios (e.g., Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011), as 
well as showing a basic understanding that practice allows one to acquire skills for the future (e.g., 
Davis, Cullen, & Suddendorf, 2016).  Generally, however, preschoolers’ future-oriented behaviours 
have almost exclusively been studied in contexts where they are prompted by experimenters to 
think about the future, either through questioning or being forced to select an item.  Few studies 
have examined children’s capacity to spontaneously consider and prepare for the future of their own 
accord.  Those studies that have (e.g., Atance et al., 2017; Brinums, Imuta, & Suddendorf, 2018) 
have found that preschoolers’ performance was rather poor, suggesting children’s capacity to 
independently contemplate and prepare for future scenarios undergoes important developments 
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beyond the preschool years.  Brinums et al., for instance, found that only from around 6 years of 
age did children begin to spontaneously practise physical skills in preparation for the future. 
It stands to reason that the ability to acquire information for the future is likely to be 
supported by similar cognitive processes as the ability to acquire physical skills for the future 
(Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016).  In both cases, children must consider the future, recognise 
the need to learn something they currently lack, and monitor and regulate their learning to acquire 
the necessary information or skill.  Therefore, the development of both episodic foresight (one’s 
capacity to envision the future and regulate behaviour accordingly; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Suddendorf & Moore, 2011) and metacognition (one’s knowledge of and capacity to regulate one’s 
own cognition; Flavell, 1979) likely plays a key role in children’s ability to learn both information 
and skills for the future.  As discussed above, episodic foresight emerges and develops rapidly 
during the preschool years, becoming more flexible through the primary school years (for a review, 
see Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  Likewise, children’s metacognitive monitoring and control 
undergoes important developments in the preschool and primary school years.  Generally, 
children’s awareness of what they do and do not know is reasonably accurate from as early as the 
preschool years (Lyons & Ghetti, 2011; Marazita & Merriman, 2004).  However, their ability to 
monitor changes in knowledge states (Esbensen, Taylor, and Stoess, 1997) and flexibly control their 
learning behaviour (Schneider & Lockl, 2008) is thought to have a more protracted development.  
For example, it is not until at least age 6 (Destan, Hembacher, Ghetti, & Roebers, 2014) that 
children differentiate between easy-to-learn and hard-to-learn information when allocating study 
time, and this age aligns with the age at which children also start to deliberate practise skills 
(Brinums, Imuta, & Suddendorf, 2018).  One might, therefore, predict that spontaneous information 
seeking would also emerge around the early primary school years and develop substantially across 
middle childhood.      
The Current Study 
To investigate young children’s ability to spontaneously seek appropriate information for an 
anticipated future event, we presented 4- to 7-year-olds with a game wherein they had to decide 
which of two sets of information (target vs distractor) to learn for a future test.  The game was 
similar to the paradigm used by Miller and her colleagues (Miller et al., 1986; Miller et al., 1991; 
Miller & Weiss, 1981; Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988) to assess children’s selective attention, 
wherein children were required to preferentially attend to target information.  The key difference 
between the current game and Miller and her colleagues’ paradigm is that, rather than explicitly 
instructing children to learn the target information, we had children make their own decisions about 
which set of information to learn by simply informing them that they would be tested on the target 
set later. 
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If children selectively seek information in preparation for the future, then they should attend 
to and study the information with the future purpose (target information) rather than the information 
without a future purpose (distractor information).  Furthermore, they should be more likely to 
engage in mnemonic strategies, such as rehearsing the information and self-testing their recall 
during the study phase.  Based on Brinums et al.’s (2018) finding that most 6-year-olds, but not 
most 5-year-olds, spontaneously practised for a future task, we hypothesised that 6- and 7-year-olds 
would be more likely to attend to target information first and show overall greater attention to target 
information than distractor information during the study time compared to 4- and 5-year-olds.  
Secondly, the older children would be more likely to spontaneously rehearse or self-test target 
information during the study time.  Finally, regardless of age, we predicted that children who spent 
more time studying the target information would show better recall of the target information.   
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 121 children from a database of parents with young children maintained by a 
university cognitive development research centre.  Three children were excluded from the final 
analysis due to noncompliance and one due to previous experience with the materials.  The final 
sample consisted of 28 4-year-olds (Mage = 4.42 years, SD = 0.19 years; 15 females), 30 5-year-olds 
(Mage = 5.39 years, SD = 0.28 years; 14 females), 30 6-year-olds (Mage = 6.40 years, SD = 0.32 
years; 16 females), and 29 7-year-olds (Mage = 7.41 years, SD = 0.28 years; 14 females) from 
middle- to upper-middle class families in a large Western city. All children were typically-
developing and fluent in English, and the majority (72%) were of European descent.  Children 
participated individually with written consent from a caregiver. 
Materials 
Two sets of six cards were used, one coloured red and the other blue.  Both sets of cards 
showed a picture of one of six animals on one side (bird, cat, dog, kangaroo, lion, and lizard).  On 
the other side, the red cards showed a picture of a toy (respectively: teddy, dinosaur, ball, doll, car, 
and puzzle) and the blue cards showed a picture of a food (respectively: carrot, orange, banana, 
apple, strawberry, and watermelon).  The toy and food pairings were arbitrary to ensure children 
could not guess the information based on general knowledge about the animals.  A 1-min sand-
timer conveyed the length of the study phase.  A giraffe hand-puppet marked the test cards. 
Procedure 
Children were first shown how the sand-timer worked before moving to another room for 
the main phase of the experiment.  Caregivers remained with children throughout the experiment. 
The experimenter sat at a table across from children and placed the cards in front of them.  
One set (red or blue, counterbalanced across participants) was placed animal-side up on the left of 
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the table in two rows of three.  The other set was placed to the right in the same formation.  A 
standing piece of cardboard was placed between the sets to emphasise the difference (see Figure 1 
for a picture of the experimental setup).  The task itself occurred in three phases: task exposure, 
study, and test (see Appendix B for the experimenter’s script). 
Exposure phase.  This phase was included so the children learned they lacked knowledge 
of the target information.  The experimenter introduced children to the puppet and told them they 
would be playing the puppet’s favourite game, which was to guess each animal’s favourite thing.  
The experimenter told children that under the red/blue cards were pictures of the animals’ favourite 
foods/toys.  The experimenter placed the puppet on the left side of the table and told children the 
giraffe wanted to play with that set of cards first.  She then asked children to guess each animal’s 
favourite food/toy (moving through cards left to right, top row then bottom row), flipping the card 
after each guess to reveal the correct answer, and telling children the answer to ensure they knew 
the name of each food/toy.  After children had guessed all six cards of the first set, the experimenter 
moved the puppet to the right side of the table and told children the giraffe now wanted to play with 
the remaining set of cards.  Children then repeated the guessing game with these cards.  Children 
did not reliably guess cards correctly in the exposure phase. 
Figure 1.  The experimental setup from the children’s perspective.  The red and blue cards were 
placed on opposite sides of the cardboard barrier with their animal sides facing up.  The green 
sand-timer marked how long the children had to study the information presented on the cards.  
The puppet marked the cards that the children would be playing with once the sand-timer had 
completed its cycle.  Figure reprinted with permission from “The nature, ontogeny, and 
phylogeny of episodic foresight” by Jonathan Redshaw, 2014, Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, The University of Queensland, Australia. 
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Study phase.  The experimenter then placed the puppet behind either the red or blue cards 
(counterbalanced across participants), telling children that the giraffe only wanted to play with 
those cards now (target cards) and no longer wanted to play with the other cards (distractor cards); 
the experimenter reiterated this instruction twice.  She told children that they would play the 
guessing game again in 1 min (indicated with the sand timer) and that this next time they would win 
a sticker for every target card they guessed correctly.  The experimenter told children that, while 
they waited for the 1 min to pass, they would have a chance to look under any of the cards.  The 
experimenter did not explicitly tell children to study the target cards but told children they could 
look under any of the cards until the 1 min sand timer ran out and lifted up a red card and a blue 
card to emphasise that they could look under either set of cards.  The experimenter then turned the 
timer over to begin the 1-min study phase.  During this phase, if children sat without looking at the 
cards, the experimenter commented that there was time left and they could keep looking if they 
wanted to, in case children thought they were not allowed to look under the cards multiple times.  If 
after this reminder, children still did not look under the cards, the experimenter remained silent until 
the sand had finished falling.   
Test phase.  Following the study phase, children played the guessing game1 with the six 
target cards, moving through cards in the same order as the exposure phase.  Each correct answer 
was rewarded with a sticker. 
Scoring   
Coding of children’s responses was conducted from video taken during the experimental 
session.  Eight children (one 4-year-old, four 5-year-olds, two 6-year-olds, and one 7-year-old) had 
missing data for some measures due to technical problems with the video recording and were 
excluded from the analyses for which they were missing data.   
During the study phase, we measured which card set children viewed a card from first, how 
much time children spent viewing each card set, and whether children were observed rehearsing or 
self-testing target information.  A child was considered to be viewing the card sets if they were 
looking at the pictures.  A child was considered to be rehearsing if they were saying or mouthing 
target information in order repetitively, or were pointing to each card or gazing at each card in order 
repetitively.  A child was considered to be self-testing their recall if they had all target information 
hidden and were attempting to guess each card's target information in turn before turning cards over 
                                                             
1 Unlike in the Exposure Phase, children did not give random or irrelevant answers in the Test 
Phase.  Instead, incorrect answers were either a response that would have been correct for a 
different card or children indicating they could not remember.  This pattern of responses suggests 
children understood the purpose of the game was to remember the information under the cards.   
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to check whether their guess was correct.  During the test phase, we assessed how many answers 
children got correct.  One experimenter scored all videos and a second trained coder, blind to each 
child’s age, scored 20% of the videos. 
First card viewed.  There was perfect agreement between the two coders. 
Time spent viewing target information.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed by calculating 
an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) estimate based on a mean-rating (k = 2), absolute-
agreement, 2-way random-effects model.  The resulting intraclass correlation coefficient indicated 
excellent agreement, ICC = .99 (95% CI, .97 to .99), p < .001. 
Time spent viewing distractor information.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed by 
calculating an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) estimate based on a mean-rating (k = 2), 
absolute-agreement, 2-way random-effects model.  The resulting intraclass correlation coefficient 
indicated excellent agreement, ICC = .97 (95% CI, .92 to .99), p < .001. 
Mnemonic strategy use.  Rates of strategy use among children were low overall.  Due to its 
known sensitivity to distributional skew (Xu & Lorber, 2014), Cohen’s kappa is, therefore, an 
inappropriate measure of inter-rater reliability of mnemonic strategy use.  However, agreement 
among coders was high (90%). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of sex.  Therefore, results were collapsed across 
sex for further analysis.   
First Card Viewed 
Most children in each age group viewed a target card first (82% of the 4-year-olds, 92% of 
the 5-year-olds, 86% of the 6-year-olds, and 89% of the 7-year-olds).  Binomial tests revealed all 
age groups selected a target card first significantly above chance (.50)(binomial ps < .002). 
Time Spent Viewing Information 
Overall, children in all age groups spent most of the study phase viewing target or distractor 
information (86%, 87%, 90%, 97% of the total 1-min study phase for 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds, 
respectively).  The overall amount of time spent looking at cards of any set did not significantly 
differ between age groups, F(3, 108) = 2.44, p = .069, η2 = .07.  Thus, there was no evidence that 
information seeking itself (for both target and distractor information) varied with age.  
To test if children spent more time studying target information than distractor information, 
the time children spent viewing target and distractor information was entered into a 4 (Age Group: 
4-, 5-, 6-, 7-year-olds) x 2 (Information Type: target, distractor) mixed ANOVA.  There was no 
effect of age group, F(3, 105) = 2.44, p = .069, ηp2 = .07, but there was a main effect of information 
type, F(1, 105) = 47.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .31, and a significant interaction effect, F(3, 105) = 4.54, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .16 (see Figure 2).  Follow-up testing revealed 6- and 7-year-olds spent significantly 
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longer looking at target information compared with distractor information, Fs > 18.11, ps < .001, 
ηp2s > .15, whereas 4- and 5-year-olds did not, Fs < 3.24, ps > .075, ηp2s < .03 (see Table C1 in 
Appendix C for Ms and SDs).   
 
Mnemonic Strategies 
A minority of children across all age groups showed evidence of mnemonic strategy use 
during the study phase (4%, 19%, 24%, and 35% of 4-, 5-, 6-, and 7-year-olds, respectively).  A 4 
(Age Group: 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-year-olds) x 2 (Strategy Use: no evidence, evidence) chi-square test for 
linear trend revealed the association between children’s age and children’s strategy use was 
significant, χ2(1, N = 111) = 8.57, p = .003, φcramer = .28.  Older children were more likely than 
younger children to spontaneously rehearse or self-test target information.   
To test whether children who showed evidence of strategy use spent more time studying 
target information than children who did not, the time children spent viewing target and distractor 
information was entered into a 2 (Strategy Use: no evidence, evidence) x 2 (Information Type: 
target, distractor) mixed ANOVA.  There was a main effect of strategy use, F(1, 107) = 4.85, p = 




































Figure 2. The mean time children of each age group spent viewing target and distractor 
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significant interaction effect, F(1, 107) = 32.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .23 (see Figure 3).  Follow-up 
testing revealed children who used mnemonic strategies spent significantly more time viewing 
target information and significantly less time viewing distractor information than children who did 
not appear to use strategies, Fs > 24.38, ps < .001, ηp2s > .19 (see Table C1 in Appendix C for Ms 
and SDs).  In fact, most (78%) of the children who appeared to use these strategies spent the entire 
studying phase exclusively viewing target information, while only a minority (21%) of the other 
children did so. 
 
Test Phase Recall 
A multiple regression analysis was performed to test if children’s exact age (in years) and 
the time they spent viewing target information predicted the number of cards they correctly recalled 
during the test phase.  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, correlations, and analysis results.  The 
model including exact age and target information viewing time accounted for a significant 54% of 
the variance in recall, F(2, 106) = 61.07, p < .001.  Both age and time spent viewing target 
information were significant positive predictors of recall.  That is, both older children and children 
who spent more time viewing target information were expected to recall more target information 
during the test phase, after controlling for the other predictor in the model (see Table C2 in 




































Figure 3. The mean time children who did or did not show evidence of mnemonic strategy use 
spent viewing target and distractor cards.  Error bars represent standard error. *** p < .001  
*** 
*** 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Results From the Regression Analysis. 
*** p < .001 
 
Discussion 
The current study examined children’s early capacity to think ahead about what information 
they will need in the future and to set out to acquire it in preparation.  We presented 4- to 7-year-
olds with two sets of cards with information presented on the back.  Children were told the 
information on one set of cards would be useful in the near future (target information) and that 
information on the other set of cards would not be (distractor cards).  They were then given 1 min to 
study the information on the cards.   
The number of children choosing to view a target card first during the study phase did not 
differ between age groups, with almost all children first selecting a target card.  This finding may 
indicate that most children understood the importance of the target cards and started the study phase 
with the intention of learning the target information.  Alternatively, children may have chosen to 
view a target card first simply because the target cards were highlighted to them only seconds 
before, rather than because of any intention to study the information.  Indeed, many younger 
children subsequently viewed a distractor card immediately after the initial selection.   
Across the entire 1-min study period, only 6- and 7-year-olds spent more of the study phase 
attending to target information than distractor information, whereas the 4- and 5-year-olds spent 
similar amounts of time attending to both sets of cards.  This finding suggests that the 6- and 7-
year-olds, but not 4- and 5-year-olds, were able to identify and selectively seek the information that 
they needed to learn for the future without explicit prompting. 
Furthermore, older children were more likely to use mnemonic strategies that support the 
acquisition of information (Bjorklund, Dukes, & Brown, 2009).  The number of children using 
strategies increased steadily with each age group, from only one 4-year-old (4%) through to ten 
(34%) 7-year-olds rehearsing or self-testing target information.  While these behaviours are not a 
direct measure of information seeking, and are perhaps more indicative of children’s awareness and 
 M (SD) Correlation with Recall β sr
2 
Recall 3.83 (1.82) -   
Exact Age  5.94 (1.16) .63*** .49*** .21 
Target Information 
Viewing Time 37.25 (17.92) .57*** .40*** .14 
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capacity to use memory strategies which is known to develop significantly through middle 
childhood and into adolescence (for a review, see Bjorklund et al., 2009), they do indicate that these 
children were mindful of the upcoming game and the need to prepare for it.  Indeed, we found that 
children who rehearsed or self-tested target information spent longer studying the target information 
than children who did not show these behaviours; most who used these strategies spent the entire 
study phase attending exclusively to the target information.  Finally, we found that, regardless of 
age, children who spent longer viewing target information recalled more items during the test 
phase, substantiating the presumption that selective attention to target information during the study 
phase was beneficial to encoding it. 
Our findings that 6- and 7-year-olds, but not 4- and 5-year-olds engaged in future-oriented 
information seeking behaviours align with age-related differences found in Brinums et al.’s (2018) 
study of 4- to 7-year-olds’ future-oriented skill acquisition.  When children had an opportunity to 
practise a skill with a future purpose, 6- and 7-year-olds, but not 4- to 5-year-olds, spent longer 
playing a game associated with that skill over distractor games and, when asked, reported doing so 
to practise for the future event.  The consistency in the pattern of age-related differences across 
these two studies suggests that the proclivity for acquiring information and skills for the future may 
be supported by similar cognitive processes (cf., Davis et al., 2016).   
In both the current study and Brinums et al. (2018), children must have both the episodic 
foresight and metacognitive capacity to envision a future event in which specific information or 
skills will be useful, recognise they currently lack the necessary information or skills, select and 
employ appropriate strategies to acquire them, and monitor and evaluate progress towards their 
learning goal.  Both episodic foresight and metacognition emerge by the end of the preschool period 
and continue to develop substantially across middle childhood (for reviews, see Schneider & Lockl, 
2008; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that children’s ability to 
spontaneously engage in future-oriented information seeking and skill acquisition seem to emerge 
around age 6, and likely continue to improve across the primary school years. 
In the current study, it is difficult to determine whether insufficient episodic foresight ability 
or insufficient metacognitive ability was more likely to be responsible for the chance-level 
performance of the 4- and 5-year-olds.  In Woody-Ramsey and Miller’s (1988) study, the 
researchers showed that 4-year-olds could learn to selectively attend to target information on similar 
tasks when they were not required to think ahead about what information was needed in the future.  
Moreover, studies on children’s use of memory strategies show that preschoolers will selectively 
attend to information they are trying to memorise (Bjorklund et al., 2009), indicating that children 
in this age range are capable of applying selective learning strategies.  There are two key 
differences between our task and previous selective learning tasks (e.g., Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 
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1988).  First, while previous studies told children which information they need to memorise, we did 
not; instead, we simply identified which information had a future purpose.  Second, previous studies 
typically used multiple trials and collapsed results across trials, while in our study participants only 
received one trial to rule out simple learning explanations for the future-directed behaviour (per 
criteria proposed by Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010).  These differences were introduced to increase 
the likelihood that our task relied on episodic foresight—children were required to consider the 
future to determine which information to learn and could not instead learn to apply the correct 
strategy through trial-and-error.  Therefore, 4- and 5-year-olds may have performed poorly on our 
task because they struggled to think ahead and determine for themselves which information they 
should be memorising from the very first trial.   
However, it could be argued that these two differences also increased the metacognitive 
demands of the task.  By removing the instruction to children about which information they needed 
to learn, we removed a cue to children about which information to attend to.  In the previous 
studies, when children were cued to attend to particular information there was no need for them to 
monitor current knowledge states or make decisions about what to learn.  In the current study, given 
explicit cues were removed children needed to make these metacognitive decisions for themselves.  
Further research should be undertaken to determine exactly why young children have trouble with 
this task: do they fail to consider the future scenario, do they not recognise the need to preferentially 
learn certain information, or are they struggling to regulate their behaviour accordingly?  Future 
studies could, for example, include verbal measures in which children’s understanding of the task is 
explored and they are asked to explain their decisions.   
It should be noted that another explanation for the young children’s poor performance on 
this task may be not due to a lack of episodic foresight or metacognition necessarily, but because 
the younger children may not have sufficiently understood that they would be tested only on the 
target cards.  While the experimenter reiterated to children that they would only be playing with one 
set of cards for the remaining time, the experimenter’s instruction that children could choose to look 
under either set of cards during the study phase may have confused the younger children.  The 
inclusion of verbal measures testing children’s understanding of the task could help rule out this 
alternative explanation in future studies. 
The current study is one of the first to examine the earliest emergence of children’s capacity 
to spontaneously learn in preparation for a future event and, as such, we chose to use only a short 
delay between informing children about the future task and presenting them with it.  Furthermore, 
while we did not explicitly prompt children to learn particular information, the task was still quite 
structured and may not reflect everyday situations in which children spontaneously prepare for the 
future.  Further research should, therefore, examine children’s capacity to seek information for 
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long-term and ongoing learning goals outside of a lab environment.  Nevertheless, the current study 
makes headway at examining more spontaneous forms of children’s future-oriented behaviour. 
Another important consideration that was beyond the scope of the current study is the role of 
social factors, such as socioeconomic status and schooling, in the development of future-oriented 
information seeking.  There is evidence showing that home and school environments strongly 
impact metacognitive development, both through direct instruction of learning strategies and 
through attitudes and beliefs surrounding learning (for a review, see Kurtz, 1990).  Therefore, 
children’s metacognitive knowledge and skills are likely to improve considerably even in the first 
years of schooling.  Consistent with this, in the present study, we found significant improvements in 
children’s information seeking behaviours between 5 and 6 years of age—the age at which the 
majority of our sample first began formal schooling.  In the current study, children’s age and the 
amount of time they had spent in formal schooling were too highly correlated (r = .94) to determine 
whether schooling was a significant predictor of children’s engagement with the target information 
and their strategic behaviours over and above age.  It would, therefore, be interesting to examine the 
future-oriented information seeking capacities of children living in communities where formal 
schooling is not prevalent or begins later in childhood to determine whether age or schooling is a 
more influential causal factor in its development. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the current study is an important initial step in understanding how young 
children develop the capacity to purposefully seek out relevant information for the future.  The 
findings point to significant developments between 5 and 6 years.  This aligns with a recent study 
examining children’s capacity to spontaneously practise skills for the future (Brinums et al., 2018), 
suggesting the two capacities may be related and that the early primary school years may be a time 
of critical developments in children’s capacity to regulate their learning with the future in mind.  A 
better understanding of the processes underlying the development of these future-directed capacities 
is critical to understanding how humans come to have such a versatile learning system that allows 
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Preface 
Chapter 3 examines the early development of children’s understanding of deliberate practice 
and their capacity to spontaneously practise a skill in preparation for a future event.  In this chapter, 
I present the findings of two experiments which build on Davis, Cullen, and Suddendorf’s (2016) 
initial study examining preschoolers’ deliberate practice behaviour.  Experiment 1 aimed to address 
limitations in Davis et al.’s study and extend the age range to examine 4- to 6-year-olds’ 
understanding and capacity to engage in deliberate practice.  However, I observed during testing 
that my methodology also had issues: one of the four motor skill games that children were 
presented was far more appealing to them than the other three. Observations during testing (and 
subsequently confirmed by statistical analyses) revealed that children were choosing to play the 
game because they enjoyed it rather than because they intended to practise and improve their skill 
level.  Given this, I decided to stop testing early at 65 participants and restart the study with the 
highly appealing game removed.  For the second experiment, I retained the remaining three games 
because the initial experiment revealed that they were of roughly equal appeal.  I also extended the 
age range again to include 7-year-olds, as the 6-year-olds in the initial experiment did not appear to 
be practising for very long.  While the behavioural measure in Experiment 1 was problematic, I 
chose to present the work in this thesis as some of the verbal measures were not impacted by the 
methodological issue and provided clear data on children’s understanding of deliberate practice that 
support the findings from Davis et al.’s study and, subsequently, from Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 is published as an empirical report1 in the journal Child Development.  I 
developed the study concept and design, collected, analysed, and interpreted all data, and drafted 
and revised the manuscript.  Kana Imuta and Thomas Suddendorf co-authored this published report, 
providing critical revisions and feedback on the draft prepared by me.   
 
1 Brinums, M., Imuta, K., & Suddendorf, T. (2018). Practicing for the future: Deliberate practice in 
early childhood. Child Development, 89, 2051-2058. doi:10.1111/cdev.12938 
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Abstract 
Deliberate practice is essential for acquiring a wide range of skills that have been central to 
humans’ adaptive success, yet little is known about when and how children develop this capability.  
I present two experiments testing children’s ability to selectively practise a skill that would be 
useful in the near future, as well as their broader understanding of the role of deliberate practice in 
skill acquisition.  Six- and seven-year-olds demonstrated both an explicit understanding of 
deliberate practice and the capacity to practise without being prompted.  Five-year-olds showed an 
understanding of deliberate practice and some capacity to practise, while 4-year-olds showed 
neither of these capabilities.  Findings reveal important developments in children’s future-directed 
behaviour beyond the preschool years. 
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Practising for the future: Deliberate practice in early childhood 
Humans have an unparalleled capacity to wilfully shape their future selves.  One way we do 
this is by selectively acquiring skills through deliberate practice – that is, self-initiated repetitive 
behaviour primarily aimed at improving skills for the future (Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016).  
Research on deliberate practice has typically focused on its role in the acquisition of high-level 
expertise in special domains such as music (e.g., Campitelli & Gobet, 2011; Coughlan, Williams, 
McRobert, & Ford, 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993; Hambrick et al., 2014; 
Macnamara, Hambrick, & Oswald, 2014).  However, people also practise deliberately to attain 
moderate levels of performance in many ordinary contexts.  Even young children are often 
encouraged to practise skills needed for everyday life, from mundane tasks such as tying shoelaces 
through to those needed for academic success such as reading and writing, and by adulthood, most 
people are likely to have devoted thousands of hours honing skills they wanted to improve.  In fact, 
selective practising is largely responsible for the extraordinary diversity of human expertise 
(Suddendorf, 2013).   Yet despite broad implications for diverse basic skills, academic achievement, 
and expertise, the development of children’s understanding of and engagement in this fundamental 
capacity has been long overlooked. 
The focus of the current study, therefore, was to explore age-related differences in young 
children’s capacity to understand deliberate practice as a means of improving skills and, in turn, 
practise for the future.  For present purposes, the defining feature of deliberate practice is that 
children engage in repetitive activities with the intention to improve their short- or long-term future 
skills (Suddendorf et al., 2016), whereas in the literature on elite expertise, other factors such as 
structured activities designed to improve performance have been highlighted (e.g., Ericsson et al., 
1993).   
According to our above definition, children must first have some capacity to foresee the 
future utility of a skill (i.e., episodic foresight).  Metacognition and executive function have also 
been theorised to be critical to deliberate practice as they allow children to monitor and control their 
learning (Suddendorf et al., 2016).  These three complex cognitive capacities have protracted 
developmental trajectories, emerging in the preschool years but continuing to undergo significant 
developments through childhood and into adolescence (for reviews, see Best & Miller, 2010; 
Schneider & Lockl, 2008; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  This suggests that while preschoolers 
may have some capacity to practise for the future, their understanding and engagement in deliberate 
practice is likely to improve significantly throughout childhood.  To our knowledge, only one study 
(Davis, Cullen, & Suddendorf, 2016) has experimentally investigated the early development of 
deliberate practice (see Duckworth, Kirby, Tsukayama, Berstein, & Ericsson, 2011 for an 
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observational study with older children; see Pramling, 1986 for an interview with children on their 
understanding of learning through practice).   
Davis et al. (2016) tested whether 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds would selectively practise motor 
skill games to increase their capacity to obtain a reward on a future game.  In one room, children 
were shown different versions of a motor skill game and told that, if they were successful at one 
particular version later on, they would win stickers.  In a second room containing replicas of the 
games, children were asked to choose one of the games to play with for a minute before returning to 
the first room.  The 4- and 5-year-olds, but not the 3-year-olds, selected to play the target game 
more often than would be predicted by chance.  It was unclear, however, whether they had chosen 
the target game to practise or merely because it was highlighted to them.  Therefore, in Experiment 
2, children were directly asked how they could get better at something and had to judge which of 
two puppets was more likely to win a particular competition: one who tried a skilled target 
behaviour just once, or one who tried it every day for a long period.  Across these two tasks, the 5-
year-olds demonstrated some explicit understanding of deliberate practice, whereas the 4-year-olds 
did not.    
There were, however, limitations with this initial study.  Firstly, the forced choice nature of 
the motor skill task may have led children to pick the target version because it had been highlighted 
rather than because they had intended to practise for the future test.  Secondly, the amount of time 
children actually practised was not measured. Finally, children’s verbal answers about the 
relationship between practice and performance may only reflect limited comprehension. Some 
children may have simply reported previously associated statements linking the words “practice” 
and “getting better”.  Given these methodological limitations, more research is required to 
determine the age at which children start to spontaneously practise skills in preparation for a future 
event. 
The Current Study 
The current study was designed to address these shortcomings.  Firstly, instead of 
employing a forced-choice paradigm, we allowed children to play with all games during the 
practice time.  This provided two measures of engagement in deliberate practice: whether children 
played the target game first and how long they practised each game.  Furthermore, by using games 
that required different motor skills from one another, we reduced the potential for practice on one of 
the distractor games to benefit performance on the target game.  Secondly, to confirm that 
children’s answer to the direct question indicated an understanding of deliberate practice that 
extended beyond a simple association between the words “practice” and “getting better”, we asked 
children to explain what practice is.  Thirdly, in our second experiment, we recruited a larger 
sample and prompted half the participants to consider using the free play time to prepare for the 
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test.  The ability to maintain abstract goals over prolonged delays and in the face of distractions 
develops gradually through childhood and adolescence (Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012) and 
so young children may be more reliant on external cues to trigger goal-directed behaviour.  Finally, 
we extended the age range to include 6-year-olds in Experiment 1, and again to include 7-year-olds 
in Experiment 2.  Given the protracted development of the cognitive capacities thought to underlie 
deliberate practice (Suddendorf et al., 2016), we predicted that children’s understanding and 
engagement in deliberate practice continues to develop beyond age 5. 
Through these improvements, we aimed to create more nuanced measures of children’s 
understanding of deliberate practice and to chart age-related developments in both their 
understanding and behaviour into the early school years.   
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  We recruited 65 typically-developing children to participate in this 
experiment.  Three children were excluded from the final analysis due to experimenter error.  The 
final sample consisted of 19 4-year-olds (M = 4.38 years, SD = 0.23 years; 9 females), 19 5-year-
olds (M = 5.36 years, SD = 0.22 years; 13 females), and 24 6-year-olds (M = 6.24 years, SD = 0.25 
years; 5 females) from middle to upper-middle class families in a large Australian metropolitan 
area.  Participants were recruited from a database of parents with young children maintained by the 
Early Cognitive Development Centre at the University of Queensland.  Informed consent was 
obtained from parents at the beginning of the session and both parents and children were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time.  Each child participated individually with a parent or caregiver 
present.  Children received a certificate and a small gift for participating. 
Procedure.  Children were first taken into a warm-up room where they were introduced to a 
5-min sand timer and shown how long the timer took to finish. Children were then taken to Room A 
for the main phases of the experiment.  The experiment took approximately 30 min and was filmed 
using a video camera visible to the children.  Parents accompanied children for the duration of the 
experiment.  
Engagement in deliberate practice.  In Room A, children were introduced to four familiar 
motor skill games (see Figure 1 for details).  Each game was designed to be initially difficult for 
children but easier after 5 min of practice.  The experimenter demonstrated how  
to play each game before allowing children to attempt them.  She then informed the children that 
later on they would have a test with one of the games (i.e., target game), and they would win three 
stickers if they could play the game successfully during their test. The target game was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
  





Figure 1.  Materials used for each of the motor skill games.  A) Golf game: children used 
a plastic golf club to knock a plastic golf ball from a line to land between two markers 
positioned 60 cm from the line and 30 cm apart from one another.  B) Hoop game: 
children threw a plastic hoop to land over a vertical rod positioned 50 cm away.  C) Cup 
game: a small ball was attached via string to the base of a cup.  A handle was attached to 
the base of the cup.  Children grasped the handle and swung the ball up to catch it in the 
cup using only one hand.  D) Bead game: similar to the commercially available Operation 
game.  Children used tweezers to remove a bead from a triangle-shaped hole (37 x 30 mm; 
20 mm deep) in the surface of a box without touching the edges of the hole with the 
tweezers, which would turn a light bulb on.  The edges of the hole were lined with 
aluminium foil, and this foil was connected to the light bulb, which connected to a 9 V 
battery, which connected to the tweezers via a thin insulated wire.  When the uninsulated 
ends of the tweezers touched the aluminium foil on the edges of the triangle hole, this 
created an electrical circuit, turning the light bulb on. 
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Children were then taken to Room B, where they were shown replicas of the four games from 
Room A.  They were told that they could play with them until the 5-min sand timer ran out.  The 
word “practice” was not used to instruct the children at any point.  Children were told that they 
would subsequently return to Room A for the test.  The experimenter then checked if children  
remembered which was the target game and reminded them if they could not remember.  The 
experimenter then turned the sand timer over and children were allowed to play with the games.  
After approximately 2.5 min had passed, the experimenter informed children they had half the time 
left, and when there were about 30 secs left, children were told that they only had a little bit of time 
left.  Once the sand timer finished, the experimenter asked children which game they spent the most 
time playing and why.   
Understanding of deliberate practice.  Children were then asked what they could do to get 
better at these games and what they would do at home if they wanted to get better at something. 
Children then returned with the experimenter to Room A for the test.  If children struggled 
with the game for more than 30 sec, the difficulty level was adjusted (e.g., by widening the goal in 
the “golf game”) until they succeeded.  Following the test, children received three stickers 
regardless of how well they performed. 
Finally, children were asked to explain to a puppet what practice is.  A puppet was used 
because children appeared more comfortable explaining to a naïve third party than to the 
experimenter who knew the answer. 
Scoring.  One experimenter scored all videos and a second trained coder, blind to each 
child’s age and target game, scored 50% of the videos.   
Engagement in deliberate practice.  There were two dependent measures of children’s 
engagement in deliberate practice: which game children chose to play first after the experimenter 
had left the room (indicating children’s initial intention to practise) and the percentage of total play 
time in Room B that children spent playing the target game.  A child was considered to be playing 
the game only if they were engaging with it in line with the rules provided by the experimenter 
(e.g., throwing the golf ball was not considered practising the game).   
First game selected.  There was perfect agreement between the two coders. 
Time playing target game.  Inter-rater reliability for scoring the percentage of play time 
spent playing the target game was assessed by calculating an intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) 
estimate based on a mean-rating (k = 2) absolute-agreement, 2-way random-effects model.  The 
resulting intraclass correlation coefficient indicated excellent agreement, ICC = .97 (95% CI, .94 to 
.99), p < .001. 
Reason for playing.  Children’s responses to the question about why they had chosen to play 
the game they had played the longest were scored as a dichotomous variable, attracting a 1 if they 
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gave practice, improvement, or the upcoming test as their reason (e.g., “so I’m very good at it when 
we go back to the other room”) and 0 for all other answers (e.g., “because it’s fun”).   There was 
perfect agreement between the two coders. 
Understanding of deliberate practice.  Children’s answers to questions about practice were 
scored as dichotomous variables.  
What helps you get better?  When asked what they could do to get better at something, 
children’s answers were scored 1 if they referred to practice, repetition, or persistence (e.g., 
“practice more”) and 0 if they gave other answers (e.g., “don’t know”).  There was perfect 
agreement between the two coders. 
What is practice?  Similarly, when asked if they could explain what practice is, children’s 
answers were scored 1 if they showed an understanding that practice involved repetition (e.g., “try 
it all over again and again”) and a 0 if not (e.g., “practice is getting more luck at something”).  An 
inter-rater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s kappa statistic was performed to determine 
consistency among coders.  The resulting kappa indicated almost perfect agreement, κ = .93 (95% 
CI, .80 to 1.00), p < .001.   
Results and Discussion 
Four children were missing data for some measures: one due to technical problems with the 
video recording, one due to experimenter error, and two due to non-compliance.  Missing data did 
not vary as a function of age group or condition and children were excluded from the analyses for 
which they were missing data. 
Preliminary analyses also revealed no effects of sex.  Results were collapsed across sex for 
further analysis. 
Engagement in deliberate practice    
First game selected.  Neither the 4-, 5-, or 6-year-olds selected to play their target game first 
significantly above chance (.33)(binomial ps > .196).  Most children (71%) selected to play the 
bead game first, suggesting this game may have been more appealing to children than the other 
three games. 
Time playing target game.  Overall, children spent much longer on average playing with the 
bead game (52% of total play time) than with the other games (16% - 17% of total play time), 
indicating that the four games were not equally appealing to children (see Table D1 in Appendix D 
for each age group’s average play time with each game).  In an attempt to address the problem that 
children preferred the bead game when analysing the current data, we calculated for each child the 
difference between the percentage of time they spent playing their target game and the average 
percentage of time children spent playing that game when it was not their target game.  This 
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difference score, hereafter referred to as the adjusted percentage, provided a measure of the time 
children spent playing a game over and above what we would expect if they were not practising.   
Figure 2 shows children’s average adjusted practice times as a function of age group.  A 
one-way ANOVA examining the effect of age group on adjusted percentage of practice time 
revealed children’s practice times did not differ significantly across the three age groups, F(2, 57) = 
1.95, p = .151, η2 = .06.  However, as indicated in Figure 2, only the 6-year-olds had an average 
adjusted practice time that we can be 95% confident was greater than zero.  That is, only the 6-year-
olds appeared to play their target game longer than we would expect if it was not their target game, 
suggesting they were practising for their future test (M = 13.38%, SD = 30.55%).  However, the 
unequal appeal of the four games makes it difficult to interpret children’s actual engagement in 
deliberate practice as the bead game may have been an overpowering distractor for the children, 
overriding any intentions they may have had to practise.  Therefore, children who had the capacity 
to practise for the future may not have done so in this task and results of the behavioural measures 
may underestimate children’s capacities.   
Reason for playing.  When asked why they had chosen to play the game they spent the most 
time playing with, most children in all three age groups did not give practice as their reason.  Again, 
this may have been because children found the bead game especially appealing and chose to play it 
because they enjoyed it.  Only two (12%) 4-year-olds and one (6%) 5-year-old said they played to 
practise for the future test.  On the other hand, almost half (46%) of the 6-year-olds gave this 
Figure 2.  The average adjusted percentage of time spent playing the target game as a function of 
age group.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.  Negative values on the y-
axis indicate less time spent playing the target game than the average playing time for that game 
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answer.  A 3 (age group) x 2 (reason) chi-square test for linear trend revealed this association 
between children’s age and their reason for playing was significant, χ2(1, N = 57) = 6.81 p = .009, 
φcramer = .43.  This finding supports the behavioural data in suggesting that the 6-year-olds were 
more likely than the younger children to have formed the intention to practise in preparation for 
their future test.  
Understanding of deliberate practice.  When asked what helps them get better, most 5- 
and 6-year olds (90% and 96%, respectively) responded that practice would, while only around one 
third (39%) of 4-year-olds gave this answer.  A 3 (age group) x 2 (response) chi-square test for 
linear trend revealed this association between children’s age and children’s mention of practice was 
significant χ2(1, N = 59) = 16.39, p < .001, φcramer = .59.  Similarly, there was an increase with age 
in the number of children giving appropriate answers to the question “what is practice” (22%, 63%, 
86%, respectively), χ2(1, N = 59) = 16.35, p < .001, φcramer = .54.   
Children’s responses to these two questions were significantly related, χ2(1, N = 59) = 15.43, 
p < .001, φcramer = .51, such that children who mentioned practice as something that would help 
them improve were more likely to be able to define practice than children who did not mention 
practice.  Taking these two questions together, most 4-year-olds (56%) were not able to provide a 
response to either question that indicated an understanding of deliberate practice.  On the other 
hand, more than half of 5-year-olds (58%) and most 6-year-olds (86%) were able to provide correct 
responses to both these questions, and all but one 5-year-old and one 6-year-old (95% and 96%, 
respectively) showed at least some understanding of deliberate practice by answering at least one of 
the questions correctly.  Overall, these findings indicate that children’s explicit understanding of 
deliberate practice increases between the ages of 4 to 6 years. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 addressed some methodological issues with Experiment 1.  Most notably, we 
removed the bead game as the game was far more appealing to children than the other three games, 
which had more equal appeal.  We also decided to leave children alone during the free play time, to 
address the potential problem that the experimenter’s or parent’s presence cued children to play 
with the target game.   
Because 6-year-olds did not appear to practice for very long and most did not report 
practising for the future test in Experiment 1, we decided to expand the age range to include 7-year-
olds.  We also introduced a prompt to half of the children to test whether an external cue to prepare 
for their test would increase the time children spent practising and the number of children choosing 
to play the target game first and reporting practising for the future test.  Finally, to increase 
children’s motivation to improve at the target game, we rewarded them a sticker for each success of 
   
 40 
the target game during the test, rather than giving children three stickers independent of 
performance as was the case in Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants.  We recruited 121 typically-developing children to participate in this 
experiment.  Children were recruited from the same research centre database as Experiment 1; 
however, we did not recruit children who had previously participated in the first experiment.  One 
child was excluded from the final analysis due to noncompliance.  The final sample consisted of 30 
4-year-olds (M = 4.42 years, SD = 0.20 years; 16 females), 30 5-year-olds (M = 5.39 years, SD = 
0.28 years; 14 females), 30 6-year-olds (M = 6.40 years, SD = 0.32 years; 16 females), and 30 7-
year-olds (M = 7.43 years, SD = 0.29 years; 14 females) from middle to upper-middle class families 
in a large Australian metropolitan area.  Most children had two primary caregivers who had earned 
at least an undergraduate degree (62%) and lived in a household with an annual income of more 
than AU$120,000 (68%).  Children were predominately European Australian in ethnicity (72%).  
Half of the children from each age group were randomly assigned to the cue condition, and the 
others to the no-cue condition.  Each child participated individually with written consent from a 
caregiver and received a small gift for participating. 
Procedure.  In the warm-up room, children were this time introduced to two sand timers (1-
min and 5-min) and shown how long each timer took to finish. Children were then taken to Room A 
for the main phase of the experiment, which took approximately 30 min.  Parents accompanied 
children except for the free play time in Room B.  
In Room A, children were introduced to the golf game, the hoop game, and the cup game 
from Experiment 1.  The experimenter informed children that later on they would have a 1-min test 
with one of the games (i.e., target game), during which they would win one sticker for every 
success (e.g., one sticker for every time they hit the golf ball between the markers).  The target 
game was counterbalanced across participants.   
Children were then taken to Room B, which had replicas of the three games.  They were told 
that they could play with them while the experimenter and parent went away until the 5-min sand 
timer ran out or children pressed a bell.  Children were told that they would subsequently return to 
Room A for the test.  Children in the cue condition were told, “If you like, you can use this time to 
prepare for the test” and the others: “If you like, you can use this time to play with any of the 
games.”  The experimenter then turned the sand timer over and left children alone in the room.  
Upon returning, the experimenter asked children the same questions as in Experiment 1 and 
returned with the child to Room A where their performance was tested and subsequently rewarded 
with stickers. 
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Scoring.  One experimenter scored all videos and a second trained coder, blind to each 
child’s age and target game, scored 20% of the videos. Measures were identical to Experiment 1.   
Engagement in deliberate practice. 
First game selected.  There was perfect agreement between the two coders. 
Time playing target game.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed by calculating an intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) estimate based on a mean-rating (k = 2) absolute-agreement, 2-way 
random-effects model.  The resulting intraclass correlation coefficient indicated excellent 
agreement, ICC = 0.99 (95% CI, 0.98 to 1.00), p < .001. 
Reason for playing.  An Inter-rater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s kappa statistic 
indicated substantial agreement between the two coders, κ = 0.74, p < .001. 
Understanding of deliberate practice. 
What helps you get better?  There was perfect agreement between the two coders. 
What is practice? An Inter-rater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s kappa statistic 
indicated almost perfect agreement between the two coders, κ = 0.93, p < .001. 
Results and Discussion 
Eleven children were missing data for some measures due to technical problems with the 
video recording, and one because he did not want to stay in Room B by himself.  Data for some of 
the verbal measures were excluded from all analyses for six children due to parental interference.  
Missing data did not vary as a function of age group or condition and children were excluded from 
the analyses for which they were missing data. 
Preliminary analyses also revealed no effects of sex.  Results were collapsed across sex for 
further analysis. 
Engagement in Deliberate Practice.    
First game selected.  A three-way loglinear analysis testing the association between 
children’s age, cue condition, and first game selected produced a final model that retained all 
effects.  The likelihood ratio of this model was χ2(0) = 0, p > .999.  This indicated that the highest-
order interaction (the age group x cue condition x game selection interaction) was significant, χ2(3) 
= 8.73, p = .033.  To break down this effect, separate chi-square tests on the cue condition and game 
selection variables were performed for each age group.   
For the 4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds, there was no significant association between cue condition 
and whether children selected to play with their target game first, χ2s(1) < 1.01, ps > .316, φs < .19.  
Binomial tests revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds did not select their target game significantly above 
chance (.33) regardless of whether or not they were reminded of their future test (binomial ps > 
.195).  The 7-year-olds, on the other hand, selected the target game above chance in both the cue 
and no-cue conditions (binomial ps < .016).  For the 6-year-olds, however, the association between 
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cue condition and selection of the target game first was significant, χ2(1, N = 29) = 8.19, p = .004, φ 
= .53.  Six-year-olds selected the target game first significantly above chance in the cue condition 
(binomial p < .001) but not in the no-cue condition (binomial p = .585).  Odds ratios indicated that, 
for 6-year-olds, the odds of selecting the target game first were 11.99 times higher if they were 
reminded of their test than if they were not (see Figure 3).   
Time playing target game.  To address the potential problem that children preferred certain 
games, we calculated for each child the adjusted percentage of time they spent playing their target 
game (see Table D1 in Appendix D for each age group’s average play time with each game).  
Figure 4 shows children’s average adjusted practice times as a function of age group.   
A 4 (age group) x 2 (cue condition) between subjects ANOVA examining the effect of age 
and cue condition on children’s adjusted percentage of practice time revealed a main effect of  
children’s age group, F(3, 107) = 6.41, p < .001, η2 = .10.  Neither the main effect of cue condition, 
F(1, 107) = 0.61, p > .436, η2 = .00, nor the interaction effect was significant, F(3, 107) = 0.94, p = 
.426, η2 = .01.  Pairwise comparisons using Holm-Bonferroni correction revealed that 7-year-olds 
(M = 32.62%, SD = 25.76%) spent a greater percentage of time playing their target game than did 4-



































Figure 3.  Percentage of children who selected the target game to play first during the free play 
time.  The dotted line represents the percentage of children who would be expected to select the 
target game if they were selecting randomly.  Error bars represent the upper and lower limits of the 
95% confidence interval for the percentage.  An asterisk is provided if children’s performance was 
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p < .029.  Six-year-olds (M = 21.80%, SD = 28.42%) spent a greater percentage of time playing 
their target game than did 4-year-olds, t’(55) = 2.65, p = .041.  All other comparisons were not 
significant (all t’s < 1.52, ps > .308). 
Reason for playing.  Of children who reported playing their target game the most (11 4-
year-olds, 15 5-year-olds, 17 6-year-olds, and 18 7-year-olds), the majority of 6- and 7-year-olds 
(65% and 83%, respectively) reported playing it to practise, while only 27% of 4-year-olds and 40% 
of 5-year-olds gave this response.  A 4 (age group) x 2 (reason) chi-square test for linear trend 
revealed this association between children’s age and children’s reason for playing was significant 
χ2(1, N = 61) = 10.94, p = .001, φcramer = .43.  Older children were more likely than younger 
children to give practice as their reason.  There was no effect of cue condition on children’s reason 
for playing for any age group, χ2s(1) < 1.17, ps > .280, φs < .26.   
Associations among measures.  Children who reported playing the target game to practise 
spent a greater adjusted percentage of time actually playing it (M = 40.47%, SD = 21.76%) than 
other children (M = 24.63%, SD = 24.75%), t(59) = 2.65, p = .010.  They were also more likely to 
start the free play time by playing with their target game than children who gave a different reason, 





































Figure 4.  The average adjusted percentage of time spent playing the target game as a function of 
age group.  Error bars represent 95% confidence interval of the mean.  Asterisks represent 
significant differences between age groups.  Negative values on the y-axis indicate less time spent 
playing the target game than the average playing time for that game of children who had a 
different target game. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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greater adjusted percentage of time playing their target game (M = 29.95%, SD = 25.59%) than 
children who started with a distractor game (M = 7.02%, SD = 22.72%), t(113) = 13.24, p < .001.     
Understanding of Deliberate Practice.  Supporting the findings of Experiment 1, when 
asked what helps them get better, most 5- and 6-year olds (79% and 93%, respectively) and every 7-
year-old (100%) responded that practice would, while only around one third (35%) of 4-year-olds 
gave this answer.  A 4 (age group) x 2 (response) chi-square test for linear trend revealed this 
association between children’s age and children’s mention of practice was significant χ2(1, N = 114) 
= 35.31, p < .001, φcramer = .60.  Similarly, there was an increase with age in the number of children 
giving appropriate answers to the question “what is practice” (32%, 74%, 83%, 97%, respectively), 
χ2(1, N = 113) = 28.30, p < .001, φcramer = .53.  Children’s responses to the two questions were 
significantly related, χ2(1, N = 107) = 18.53, p < .001, φ = .42, such that those who mentioned 
practice as something that would help them improve were more likely to accurately define practice 
than children who did not. 
Considering the two questions children were asked about practice together, only half of the 
4-year-olds (52%) were able to provide a response to at least one of the questions that indicated an 
understanding of deliberate practice.  On the other hand, all but two 5-year-olds (92%) and all 6- 
and 7-year-olds (100%) provided an accurate response to at least one of these questions.  Only 19% 
of the 4-year-olds answered both questions correctly, while the majority of 5- and 6-year-olds (64% 
and 74%, respectively) and all but one 7-year-old (96%) answered both questions correctly. 
Association between engagement and understanding.  Children who answered more 
questions about practice correctly spent longer playing their target game during the free play time, 
r(104) = .26, p = .007, and were more likely to report playing their target game to practice than 
children who correctly answered fewer questions, χ2(1, N = 58) = 9.05, p = .003, φcramer = .40.  
However, these associations were no longer significant when age was controlled for, ps > .136.   
General Discussion 
The current study investigated young children’s understanding of and engagement in 
deliberate practice by adapting Davis et al.’s (2016) paradigm and expanding the age range.  The 
current study replicated Davis et al.’s main findings of a significant difference in children’s 
understanding of deliberate practice between 4- and 5-year-olds.  When asked what they could do to 
get better at something, significantly more 5-year-olds than 4-year-olds mentioned practice.  When 
asked to explain what practice is, significantly more 5-year-olds than 4-year-olds answered this 
question appropriately, suggesting that children’s answers to the earlier question indicated an 
understanding of deliberate practice rather than a simple association between the words “practice” 
and “getting better”.   
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The current study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to investigate 6- and 7-year-olds’ 
understanding of deliberate practice, documenting continuing increases in competence.  All but one 
6-year-old and all 7-year-olds across the two experiments appropriately answered at least one of the 
questions about practice, with more than three quarters of the 6-year-olds and all but one of the 7-
year-olds doing so for both.  The findings suggest that between age 4 and 7 years, children acquire 
at least a basic understanding that practice can help with skill improvement.  
In line with our findings that 4-year-olds failed to demonstrate an explicit understanding of 
deliberate practice, they also did not tend to engage in deliberate practice.  Even when prompted 
about the future in Experiment 2, most 4-year-olds neither played their target game first nor played 
it for longer than distractors.  Most 4-year-olds who spent longer playing the target game did not 
report doing so to practise.  Although 5-year-olds demonstrated some evidence of deliberate 
practice in Experiment 2, the increase in time spent playing the target game was small and most 
who did play it more did not report doing so to practise. Additionally, most did not play the target 
game first, even after prompting.    
In contrast, 6- and 7-year-olds clearly practised deliberately.  They spent longer playing 
their target game and most reported doing so to practise for the test.  Interestingly, 6-year-olds who 
were cued about the test in Experiment 2 benefited: they were more likely to play the target game 
first. The 7-year-olds did not need to be reminded and chose to play the target game first regardless 
of cue condition.   
Overall, these findings reveal clear improvements in children’s deliberate practice from ages 
4 to 7 years.  Older children more often played the target game first and for longer, and more often 
reported doing so to prepare for their test.  These increases in understanding of and engagement in 
deliberate practice may be due to age-related improvements in cognitive capacities such as episodic 
foresight, metacognition, and executive function (Suddendorf et al., 2016), and we consider these 
below.    
Episodic foresight is the capacity to envision future scenarios and organise current action 
accordingly (Suddendorf, 2010; Suddendorf & Moore, 2011).  Major developments in children’s 
episodic foresight occur during the preschool years, and the capacity continues to develop 
throughout childhood (for a review, see Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  For example, while 5-
year-olds perform relatively well on tasks requiring reasoning about basic future scenarios (e.g., 
Atance, Louw, & Clayton, 2015; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011), they still struggle with 
future-oriented decisions when current and future desires conflict (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, 
Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014).  In the current task, children not only needed to select the target 
game to practise with, as they did in Davis et al.’s (2016) study, but they also needed to maintain 
that practise over a 5 min period while there were other appealing options of games to play with.  
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The ability to envision a future scenario and, in particular, one’s future feelings about that future 
scenario, is thought to play a critical role in motivating future-directed behaviour (Miloyan & 
Suddendorf, 2015), allowing us to overcome competing desires.  Given 4- and 5-year-olds 
documented difficulty with making future-oriented decisions that compete with current desires, it is 
possible that when current desires are highly salient, preschoolers either struggle to consider future 
scenarios or fail to be motivated by them.  Our finding that 6-year-olds benefited from a cue 
suggests they may be in a transitional phase wherein they do consider the future when making 
decisions but still need external support to do so.  Importantly, however, 6-year-olds who were cued 
only showed an increased propensity to try the target game first but did not spend more time on it 
overall.  The effect of prompting, therefore, may be limited to sparking their initial motivation but 
not sustained effort.  Maintaining motivation to practise likely relies heavily on an affective 
component of foresight (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015), which may have a more protracted 
development (Mahy et al., 2014).   
Metacognition refers to an understanding of one’s own cognitive capacities, as well as the 
use of this knowledge to monitor and regulate cognition (e.g., Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe & Finn, 
2013).  It plays an important role in self-directed learning (Boekaerts, 1996), as it allows one to 
reflect on current knowledge and skills, make decisions about performance goals, select and enact 
appropriate learning strategies and monitor progress towards goals.  Investigations into its 
development reveal that, while preschoolers show awareness of current knowledge and skill states 
(Destan, Hembacher, Ghetti, & Roebers, 2014), they appear to have much less awareness of 
changes in these states (e.g., Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994) and of the active role they play in 
their own learning (Pramling, 1986; Sobel and Letourneau, 2015).  Furthermore, studies show that 
it is not until at least age 6 that children start to flexibly apply effective learning strategies in 
response to their metacognitive monitoring (Destan, Hembacher, Ghetti, & Roebers, 2014).  In the 
current study, the 4- and 5-year-olds may not have practised the target game because, while they 
may have at least a basic understanding that repetition improves performance, they still lack 
awareness that they could deliberately improve their skill level through repetition.  Young children 
have been shown to believe they simply need to wait until enough time has passed for them to 
repeat a behaviour sufficient times to learn it; they do not yet understand that they can exert 
deliberate control over their practice behaviour (Pramling, 1986).  Furthermore, younger children’s 
tendency to overestimate their own abilities (Plumert & Schwebel, 1997; Schneider, 1998) may 
have meant the 4- and 5-year-olds simply did not recognise the need to practice.  
Finally, executive function is the collective term for the set of cognitive processes that allow 
children to exert top-down control over their own thoughts and behaviour (e.g., Diamond, 2013).  
Munakata et al. (2012) proposed three main transitions in its development.  Firstly, infants improve 
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at maintaining goal-relevant information as they move from perseverating to inhibiting prepotent 
responses with the help of environmental cues.  Secondly, and relevant to this study’s findings, over 
the preschool and early school years, children transition from relying on environmental cues to 
proactively maintaining goal-relevant information.  Finally, children move from a reliance on 
externally-directed goals and prompts to pursuing their own goals.  When cued, our 6-year-olds 
were more likely to start practising the target game but no more likely to maintain practise than 6-
year-olds who were not cued.  This may be because, at 6 years of age, children may still be in the 
early stages of this second transition; that is, they may still be reliant on external cues to trigger 
goal-directed behaviour.  The 7-year-olds, on the other hand, seemed able to generate and maintain 
their own performance goals, performing equally well regardless of cue condition.  The 7-year-olds 
may have a greater capacity than the 6-year-olds to proactively maintain goal-relevant information 
in the face of competing desires, at least over short delays.  The 4- and 5-year-olds did not appear to 
engage in deliberate practice, regardless of cue condition.  This may be because the cue to prepare 
for the future was not salient or explicit enough for the younger children, particularly if they also 
face limitations in their capacity to envision the future or reflect on how best to prepare for it.  
Younger children may, therefore, need more explicit guidance from adults to allow them to engage 
in practice.  Given the protracted development of executive function (for a review, see Best & 
Miller, 2010), we expect to see continual improvements in children’s persistence at deliberate 
practice beyond age 7.   
The current study complements the literature on children’s use of memory strategies (e.g., 
Bebko, McMorris, Metcalfe, Ricciuti, & Goldstein, 2014; Flavell, Beach, & Chinsky, 1966; Hanten 
et al., 2007; Miller, Seier, Probert, & Aloise, 1991). Indeed, studying with the deliberate goal of 
remembering and practising to improve skills may draw on similar underlying cognitive capacities.  
Children need to have some foresight and keep their goal in mind as they regulate their attention in 
accordance with self-assessments of their current knowledge or skills.  Extensive research on 
children’s strategy use points to important developments during primary school in children’s ability 
to direct attention to goal-relevant information while ignoring irrelevant information (Bjorklund, 
Coyle, & Gaultney, 1992; Flavell et al., 1966; Kron-Sperl, Schneider, & Hasselhorn, 2008; Miller et 
al., 1991; Miller & Weiss, 1981), indicating that deliberately studying information and deliberately 
practising skills may have similar developmental trajectories.  
An important issue for future studies is identifying the role of social factors, such as 
schooling and family, in promoting the development of deliberate practice.  Teachers and caregivers 
tend to provide instruction, feedback, and reinforcements that communicate to children the role of 
effort and persistence for learning new skills (e.g., Gipps & Tunstall, 1998).  Different educational 
strategies and their interactions with age-related changes in cognitive abilities should also be 
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considered in future research.  In our sample, age and time spent in school were too highly 
correlated to disentangle their individual contributions (r = .94).  It would also be useful to examine 
the development of deliberate practice in communities where formal schooling is not prevalent.  
In conclusion, the present study provides important initial insight into the early development 
of deliberate practice in children.  Children’s understanding of deliberate practice significantly 
improved from ages 4 to 5 years, and engagement in deliberate practice clearly improved from ages 
4 to 7 years.  Importantly, however, results arise from a controlled laboratory setting with few 
distractions within a short time period, and future studies can examine more naturalistic settings and 
employ longitudinal designs.  A fuller knowledge of how deliberate practice develops is key to 
understanding how humans acquire both a range of general skills across the lifespan and the 
acquisition of highly specialised expertise in adults.  
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Preface 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that children first start to practise skills in preparation for a future 
event by age 6.  At this age, however, children do not appear to sustain practice for very long and 
while prompting children to consider preparing for their future test did increase the number of 6-
year-olds selecting to play their target game first, it did not increase the overall time they spent 
practising the target game.  In this chapter, I explore how we might foster children’s capacity to 
sustain deliberate practice for longer.  Specifically, I examined whether prompting children to 
consider their future feelings (affective forecasting) would increase the time they spent practising 
for the future.  Affective forecasting is thought to drive future-directed behaviour, but no published 
study has yet examined the extent to which it drives children’s future-directed behaviour.  Chapter 3 
reports, for the first time, findings of a study aimed at answering this question. 
This study was prepared as a short report for submission to the journal Psychological 
Science.  I developed the study concept and design, collected the majority of the data, performed all 
data analysis and interpretation, and drafted the manuscript.  Kana Imuta, Mark Nielsen, and 
Thomas Suddendorf, all co-authors on the manuscript, provided critical revisions and feedback on 
the draft prepared by me.  Jemima Kang, also a co-author, assisted with testing and data collection.  
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Abstract 
Young children are notoriously bad at practising skills they need for success, and research suggests 
deliberate practice has a protracted development.  The current study examined if anticipating 
relevant positive future emotions motivated children to practise longer in preparation for a test.  
Children (N = 151) aged 6 to 9 years were presented with skill-based games and told they would be 
tested later on one of these.  They were asked to imagine succeeding in their test and to either focus 
on that success (neutral condition) or on how they would feel (emotion condition).  Children were 
then given an opportunity to practise.  Anticipating future feelings had a strong positive influence 
on practice times of 8- and 9-year-olds, but not of younger children.  This documents for the first 
time that prompting affective forecasting can motivate 8- to 9-year-olds, and points to a potentially 
powerful way to encourage children’s skill acquisition through practice.  
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Driven by emotion: Anticipated feelings motivate children’s deliberate practice 
Over our lifetimes, we spend thousands of hours deliberately practising skills—something 
that is crucial for developing both exceptional performance (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 
1993) and ordinary capacities (Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016).  Parents and teachers often 
look for ways to motivate children’s practice; however, little is known about how to do this 
effectively. 
By around 6 years of age, most children recognise the importance of practising for the 
future; however, when given the opportunity to practise, most spend considerable time engaging in 
immediately gratifying behaviours instead (Brinums, Imuta, & Suddendorf, 2018; Davis, Cullen, & 
Suddendorf, 2016).  This is consistent with the finding that, when planning for the future, young 
children often base their decisions on current feelings and fail to consider future ones (e.g., Atance 
& Meltzoff, 2006).  In contrast, anticipated feelings play a critical role in adults’ visions of the 
future, so much so that adults tend to exaggerate the emotional impact of future events (Wilson & 
Gilbert, 2005)—a bias thought to motivate their goal-directed behaviour (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 
2015).  These findings together suggest that limitations in children’s ability to envision future 
feelings may underlie their difficulties with self-motivating deliberate practice. 
To investigate this possibility, the present research examined whether prompting 6- to 9-
year-olds to envision positive future feelings increased the time they spent practising for a future 
event.  This age range was selected based on Brinums et al.’s (2018) findings that children’s 
engagement in deliberate practice increases gradually from around 6 years of age.  Before being 
given an opportunity to practise, children were asked to imagine successful future performance: half 
were asked to focus on that outcome (neutral condition) and half on how success would make them 
feel (emotion condition).  We predicted children in the emotion condition would practise longer 
than children in the neutral condition.  Furthermore, given that in middle childhood children begin 
to represent future events with rich contextual details characteristic of adults’ prospections (e.g., 
Coughlin, Robins, & Ghetti, 2017), we predicted this effect would increase with age. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 151 children aged 6 to 9 years (Mage = 7.99 years, SD = 1.11 years; 79 females) 
from a database of parents with young children maintained by the university’s cognitive 
development research centre.  The sample size was estimated based on results of a power analysis 
to detect a medium effect (see Appendix E for details).  One child chose to withdraw from the study 
before any data was collected.  Half of the children were randomly allocated to the Neutral 
Condition and half to the Emotion Condition.  Each child participated individually with written 
consent from a caregiver and received a small gift for participating.  This study was approved by 
  53 
the authors’ institutional human research ethics board.  
Children came from middle- to upper-middle class families in a large, metropolitan Western 
city.  All children were typically-developing and fluent in English, and the majority (72%) were of 
European descent.  Most children had two primary caregivers who had earned an undergraduate 
degree (62%) and lived in a household with an annual income of more than AU$80,000 (77%).   
Procedure 
Children were first taken into a warm-up room where they were introduced to two sand 
timers (1-min and 5-min) and shown how long each timer took to finish.  Children were then taken 
to Room A for the demonstration phase of the experiment.  The experiment took approximately 30 
mins and was filmed using a video camera visible to the children.  Parents accompanied children 
except for the free play phase in Room B.  
Demonstration phase.  In Room A, the experimenter introduced children to three familiar 
motor skill games: a golf game, a quoits game, and a cup-and-ball game (see Figure 1).  The 
experimenter demonstrated how to play each game before allowing children to attempt them.  She 
then informed children that later they would have a test with one of the games (i.e., target game), 
during which they would have 1 min (measured using the 1-min sand timer) to try and achieve as 
many successes at the game as possible, and they would win one sticker for every success.  The 
target game was counterbalanced across participants.  Children were asked to predict how many 
c b a 
Figure 1.  Materials used for the three motor skill games.  For the golf game (a), children 
used a plastic golf club to knock a plastic golf ball from a yellow line to land between two 
markers positioned 125 cm from the line and 30 cm apart from one another.  For the quoits 
game (b), children stood on a blue line and tossed a plastic hoop to land over a vertical 
plastic rod (height = 15cm, diameter = 2 cm) positioned 105 cm away from the line.  For the 
cup-and-ball game (c), a cup had a small plastic ball attached to its base via a string as well 
as a wooden handle.  Children, holding only the wooden handle, needed to swing the ball up 
to catch it within the cup. 
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successes they expected to have, as well as how many successes they would ideally like to have, 
and their answers were used in the imagination prompt during the free play phase.  
Free play phase.  After the demonstration phase, children were taken to Room B, where 
they were first given prompts to imagine themselves playing the target game in the future test.  
Children in the Neutral Condition were asked to imagine themselves playing the target game 
successfully; that is, succeeding at the game the number of times they had said they would ideally 
like to succeed.  Children in the Emotion Condition were asked to imagine how they would feel if 
they were as successful at the test as they wanted to be (see Appendix F for scripts for each 
condition).  Prompts were matched for length and content so that the only difference between the 
conditions was the focus on emotions.  As a manipulation check, children were then asked to state 
what they had imagined.  Children who provided answers which did not align with what they were 
supposed to be imagining (e.g., “ice cream”) were excluded from analyses. 
Next, the experimenter revealed replicas of the three games from Room A.  The 
experimenter explained to children that they would be left alone in the room for 5 min (measured 
using the 5-min sand timer) and, during this time, they could play with any of the three games.  
Children were told that once the 5-min sand timer had finished, the experimenter would return to 
take them back to Room A for their test, but they could choose to call the experimenter back at any 
time by ringing a bell.  The experimenter then asked children what their target game was to confirm 
they remembered (all children did) before starting the sand timer and leaving the room.  If children 
chose to call the experimenter back before the sand timer had finished, the experimenter paused the 
sand timer by laying it flat, asked what children needed, and then pointed to the sand timer, saying, 
“There is still time left. Would you like to keep playing in here or are you ready to have your test?”.  
The experimenter then either restarted the sand timer and left the room again or ended the free play 
phase based on children’s responses.  It is important to note that, while we were interested in 
observing how much of this 5-min free play period children invested in practising the target game, 
the word “practice” was not used to instruct the children at any point.  
Test phase.  Once the free play phase ended, the experimenter asked children which game 
they spent the most time playing and why.  She then asked what they could do to get better at the 
game (if this was not clear to children, she asked what they would do at home if they wanted to get 
better at something).  Children then returned with the experimenter to Room A where they were 
tested on their performance of the target game.  If children struggled with the game for more than 
30 sec, the difficulty level was adjusted (e.g., by widening the goal in the “golf game”) to help them 
succeed.  Following the test, children received a sticker for each of their successes.  
Coding 
One experimenter coded all videos and a second experimenter coded 20% of the videos.  
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Focal dependent variable.  The main dependent variable was practice time, which was 
measured as the time children spent playing with the target game during the free play phase.  
Children were considered to be playing the game only if they engaged with it in line with the rules 
provided by the experimenter during the demonstration (e.g., throwing the golf ball was not 
considered playing the game).  Inter-rater reliability was assessed by calculating an intraclass 
correlation coefficient (ICC) estimate based on a mean-rating (k = 2), absolute-agreement, 2-way 
random-effects model.  The resulting intraclass correlation coefficient indicated excellent 
agreement, ICC = 0.99 (95% CI, 0.98 to 1.00), p < .001. 
Other variables of interest.  To attempt replication of earlier findings on children’s 
conceptual understanding of deliberate practice, we included the following measures used in 
previous studies (Brinums et al., 2018; Davis et al., 2016). 
Reason for playing game. To confirm that children who chose to play the target game the 
most during the free play phase did so with the intention to practise for the future test, the 
experimenter asked them why they chose to play the game they spent the most time playing.  
Children's response to this question was coded as a dichotomous variable, attracting a 1 if they 
referred to the future test (e.g., “because I wanted to practise for the competition”), and a 0 for all 
other responses (e.g., “because I really, really like it”).  An inter-rater reliability analysis using the 
Cohen’s kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among coders.  The resulting 
kappa indicated almost perfect agreement, κ = .93, 95% CIs [.80, 1.00], p < .001. 
Understanding of practice.  To test children's understanding of the role that practice plays 
in skill improvement, the experimenter asked them what they could do to get better at the games.  If 
this question was unclear to children, she also asked what they would do at home if they wanted to 
get better at something.  Children's responses to these questions were coded as a dichotomous 
variable, attracting a 1 if they referred to practice or repetition to at least one of the two questions 
(e.g., "I'll practise it more and then not practise the stuff I know I can already do") and a 0 if they 
gave other responses to both questions (e.g., "play them").  There was perfect agreement between 
the two coders. 
Results 
Four participants were missing behavioural data: three due to video recording malfunction 
and one due to non-compliance.  Behavioural data for a further ten participants were excluded from 
analyses: five for failing the manipulation check when asked to imagine the future test, three due to 
parental interference, one due to interruption of the experimental session when the child needed the 
bathroom, and one due to the child’s misunderstanding of task instructions.  Three participants were 
missing verbal data from the end of the free play period: two due to experimenter error and one due 
to non-compliance.  Verbal data for a further two participants were excluded due to parental 
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interference.  Missing and excluded data did not vary as a function of age or forecasting condition.  
Participants were only excluded from the analyses for which they were missing data. 
Preliminary analyses revealed no differences between males and females for any measures; 
results were collapsed across sex for all further analyses. 
Practice Time 
To address the potential issue that some games were more appealing to children than others, 
we calculated an adjusted practice time for each participant, which was their actual time playing 
their target game minus the average time children in their age group and forecasting condition 
played that game when it was not their target game.  To screen for outliers, we ran the regression 
model to obtain Cook’s distance for each participant and then used the conservative criterion of 
Cook’s distance > 4/N.  This flagged eight participants (three with very low adjusted practice times 
and five with very high adjusted practice times) as potentially influential outliers and we removed 
these participants from the regression analysis.  
A moderated multiple regression was conducted to examine whether forecasting condition, 
age, and a forecasting condition by age interaction predicted children’s practice time.  Age was 
mean centred to minimise multicollinearity.  The interaction term was calculated by multiplying 
forecasting condition and centred age.  The two predictors were entered into the regression analysis 
at Step 1 and the interaction term was entered at Step 2. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations between Practice Time, Forecasting Condition, and Age 
Variable M (SD) Forecasting Condition Age 
Practice Time 102.56 (89.61) .26** .21* 
Forecasting Condition - - .02 
Age 7.92 (1.05)  - 
Note. Given that forecasting condition was dichotomously-coded (neutral = -1, emotion = 1), the 
mean and standard deviation values for this variable were not meaningful and were omitted. * p < 
.05, ** p < .01. 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics and intercorrelations between practice time, forecasting 
condition, and age.  As can be seen, both forecasting condition and age were significantly correlated 
with practice time and were thus both valid predictors.  The two predictors were not significantly 
correlated with one another and collinearity was not an issue (tolerance values > .99, Variance 
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Inflation Factors < 1.01). 
At Step 1, the direct effects of forecasting condition and age predicted a significant 16% of 
the variance in practice time, F ch.(2, 125) = 11.57, p < .001.  Individually, forecasting condition 
was a significant predictor of practice time, such that children in the emotion condition practised 
longer than children in the neutral condition, β = .27, p = .001.  Forecasting condition uniquely 
explained 7% of the total practice time variance.  Age was also a significant positive predictor of 
practice time, such that increased age was linked to increased practice time, β = .27, p = .001.  Age 
uniquely explained 7% of the total practice time variance.  The practice time variance that was 
shared between forecasting condition and age, but unique to neither, was 2%. 
At Step 2, the addition of the interaction to the model significantly explained 6% of the 
variance in practice time over and above that of the direct effects of forecasting condition and age, 
indicating the presence of a significant interaction, F ch.(1, 124) = 9.09, β = .24, p = .003.  As 
predicted, the effect of forecasting condition increased with age.  The overall model containing 



































Figure 2.  Predicted practice time as a function of forecasting condition and age.  Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals of the mean.  ***p < .001 
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practice time variance, F(3, 124) = 11.24, p < .001.  
The significant interaction was followed up by calculating the simple slopes of forecasting 
condition at age 6, 7, 8, and 9 years (see figure 2).  There was no significant effect of forecasting 
condition at ages 6, β = -.17, p = .304, sr2 < .01, and 7, β = .06, p = .589, sr2 < .01, such that 
children in the emotion condition did not practise their target game longer than those in the neutral 
condition.  However, there was a significant effect of forecasting condition at age 8, β = .29, p < 
.001, sr2 = .08, and at age 9, β = .52, p < .001, sr2 = .13, such that children in the emotion condition 
practised their target game significantly longer than children in the neutral condition. 
Reason for Playing Game   
The majority of children reported playing the target game the most (57%, 66%, 73%, and 
68% of 6-, 7-, 8-, and 9-year-olds, respectively) and, of these children, 94% did play their target 
game the most.  There were no significant differences between age groups, χ2(3) = 2.01, p = .570, φ 
= .12, or forecasting conditions, χ2(1) = 2.05, p > .152, φ = .12, in the number of children reporting 
playing the target game the most.  Of the children who reported playing their target game the most, 
the majority (94%, 84%, 74%, and 95% of 6-, 7-, 8-, and 9-year-olds, respectively) said they did so 
to practise for their future test.  Again, there were no significant differences between age groups 
χ2(3) = 5.53, p = .137, φ = .25, or forecasting conditions, χ2(1) = 1.54, p = .214, φ = .13.  
Understanding of Practice   
When asked what could help them improve at the games, the majority of children (93%, 
90%, 92%, and 97% of 6-, 7-, 8- and 9-year-olds, respectively) responded that practice or repetition 
would help.  There were no significant differences between age groups in the number of children 
who gave this answer, χ2(3) = 1.19, p = .755, φ =.09.   
Overall, results of these two measures were consistent with previous studies (Brinums et al., 
2018; Davis et al., 2016), showing that by age 6 most children can demonstrate a basic 
understanding of deliberate practice and engage in this behaviour. 
Discussion 
Children’s capacity to engage in deliberate practice has considerable implications for their 
academic achievement and for the development of both general skills and highly specialised 
expertise (Brinums et al., 2018).  Here, prompting children aged 8 years and older to envision 
positive future feelings increased their time spent practising, providing the first empirical evidence 
for a simple way to motivate children to engage in this important future-oriented behaviour. 
Anticipated feelings signal value, risk, and uncertainty, helping one to connect with and care 
about one’s future self and, in turn, drive behaviour towards goals that increase one’s well-being 
(Boyer, 2008; Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015).  In the primary school years, children’s visions of the 
future may not always be vivid enough to spontaneously evoke these anticipated feelings (Coughlin 
  59 
et al., 2017).  Encouragements that explicitly prompt children to forge an empathetic connection 
with their future selves, therefore, may be the key to helping them overcome current desires that 
interfere with future-directed behaviours.  
Notably, the effect of affective forecasting increased with age and no effect was observed 
for children aged 7 years and younger.  At this age, children’s affective forecasts may rely on 
learned scripts about how one should feel, rather than on episodic imagery that evokes emotion 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005).  Furthermore, younger children may struggle to consider future 
affective and motivational states, particularly when they differ from current ones—an aspect of 
episodic foresight that is thought to have a protracted development (Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & 
Kliegel, 2014).  Therefore, prompting may not have been sufficient to help younger children 
envision their future feelings in sufficient episodic detail to drive behaviour.  These findings 
highlight the importance of developing age-appropriate methods to foster children’s deliberate 
practice.   
In the current study, we examined how future feelings influence children’s practice for an 
event in the near future and further research should determine how anticipated feelings influence 
long-term persistence, which is essential to acquiring complex skills.  Future research should also 
investigate whether children differ in the extent to which they are motivated by their future feelings.  
Nevertheless, this study provides an important first step in discovering effective methods for 
fostering children’s deliberate practice, and findings are of relevance to caregivers and educators 
looking for ways to support children’s skill acquisition.  These findings also highlight the 
importance of considering episodic foresight in theories of children’s self-regulated learning and 
provide insight into how we develop such a powerful drive to improve our capacities and shape our 
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Despite its importance in schooling and for the development of expertise, before my 
doctoral research, little was known about how and when children first start to self-initiate learning 
with the future in mind.  This thesis presented three empirical studies examining the age at which 
children first start to spontaneously seek information (Chapter 2) and skills (Chapter 3) in 
preparation for a future event, and exploring one potential way to support this behaviour in young 
children (Chapter 4).  In this final chapter, I briefly summarise the findings from each of these 
studies, discuss their theoretical and practical implications, and highlight important open questions 
and future directions. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
Chapter 2: Future-Oriented Information Seeking 
A previous study by Woody-Ramsey and Miller (1988) showed that children as young as 4 
years old can learn over trials to selectively seek out information needed in the future when 
explicitly told which information to learn.  In everyday life, however, we often need to seek 
information without any explicit external prompts to do so.  The study presented in Chapter 2 aimed 
to examine, for the first time, the age at which children first start to spontaneously (without 
prompting or instruction) think ahead about what information will be useful in a future event and 
selectively seek out that information in preparation.  I modified the paradigm used by Woody-
Ramsey and Miller so that, rather than being told which information they needed to memorise, 
children were told which information had a future purpose and which did not.  This meant that 
children needed to think ahead about the future event and recognise the need to learn the 
appropriate information in preparation.  Additionally, rather than giving children multiple trials 
over which they could learn to apply the appropriate strategy, I gave children only one trial.  This 
ensured children’s success could be explained by their use of foresight as opposed to trial-and-error 
learning.  Under these conditions, 6- and 7-year-olds showed evidence of selectively attending to 
the relevant information in preparation for the future test, while 4- and 5-year-olds did not. These 
findings suggest that the capacity to spontaneously seek information in preparation for a future 
event first emerges around age 6.  
Chapter 3: Deliberate Practice 
Two initial studies on children’s deliberate practice suggest children begin to understand 
that they can deliberately rehearse skills to improve their future performance by around age 5 or 6 
years (Davis, Cullen, & Suddendorf, 2016; Pramling, 1986); however, prior to this thesis, no 
published study had yet examined the extent to which young children apply this knowledge to their 
behaviour in practising for the future.  Chapter 3 reports the first empirical investigation of 4- to 7-
year-olds’ capacity to spontaneously practise in preparation for a future event.  Using a modified 
version of Davis et al.’s deliberate practice paradigm, I examined whether children would choose to 
  62 
devote more time to learning a skill that would be useful in the near future over two other skills that 
would not be useful.  This modified version of the paradigm provided a more nuanced measure of 
the extent to which children actually practised for the future.  I also asked children why they chose 
to play with the game they spent the most time playing to assess children’s intentions behind their 
behaviour.  Finally, I included two questions assessing children’s basic understanding of deliberate 
practice. 
I found that 6- and 7-year-olds showed both an explicit understanding of practice and the 
capacity to practise for the future test without prompting.  Five-year-olds showed an understanding 
of practice and some capacity to practise—they spent slightly longer playing the relevant game but, 
unlike the 6- and 7-year-olds, most did not report doing so to practise for the future test.  Four-year-
olds showed neither an understanding of practice nor evidence of practising for the future.  These 
findings support previous studies suggesting children’s understanding of deliberate practice 
emerges around age 5 or 6 years (Davis et al., 2016; Pramling, 1986), and demonstrates that 
children also start to engage in deliberate practice by age 6.  These findings also correspond to the 
age at which future-directed information seeking first emerges, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
suggesting this age to be a time of critical developments in children’s capacity to learn with the 
future in mind.   
Chapter 4: Motivating Deliberate Practice 
Having established the age at which children start to self-initiate learning with the future in 
mind, the final study of this thesis aimed to investigate one way to facilitate future-directed learning 
in young children.  It has been suggested that affective forecasting, the capacity to anticipate one’s 
future feelings, plays a critical role in motivating future-directed behaviours (e.g., Miloyan & 
Suddendorf, 2015; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).  Indeed, previous studies on adults have demonstrated 
that the intensity of participants’ predictions of the affective impact of future events is related to the 
effort they expend and their persistence in working towards goals (Greitemeyer, 2009; Morewedge 
& Buechel, 2013).  To the best of my knowledge, the study reported in Chapter 4 is the first attempt 
at investigating whether affective forecasting also motivates children’s deliberate practice. More 
specifically, I tested whether a simple prompt to consider how they would feel after achieving 
success on a future skill test could increase the time children spent practising in preparation for that 
test.  
I tested children aged 6 to 9 years in this final study, and I used the same behavioural 
paradigm as I used in Chapter 3.  This time, before leaving children alone to play with the games, I 
prompted them to imagine themselves succeeding on their future test.  Half the children were asked 
to focus on achieving success and half were asked to focus on how they would feel achieving that 
success.  I found that prompting 8- and 9-year-olds to think about their future feelings increased the 
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amount of time they spent practising.  These findings support previous studies with adults showing 
that affective forecasting can increase persistence in working towards a future goal (Greitemeyer, 
2009; Morewedge & Buechel, 2013) and show, for the first time, that it can increase deliberate 
practice in children as young as 8 years.   
Learning for the Future: Emergence and Early Development 
Overall, the findings reported in this thesis suggest that children first start to self-initiate 
learning with the future in mind between the ages of 5 and 6 years and their capacity to do so 
continues to undergo age-related improvements through the early primary school years.  
Furthermore, the current findings show that children’s capacity to deliberately learn information for 
the future emerges around the same age as their capacity to deliberately learn skills for the future, 
providing initial support for the hypothesis that the two behaviours are supported by similar 
underlying cognitive capacities (Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016).  It is likely that by age 6, 
children have at least a basic ability to think ahead about what information or skills are needed in 
the near future (process 1), are aware that they currently lack the necessary information and skill 
(process 2), have a basic understanding of learning strategies (process 3), and can regulate their 
behaviour to acquire the information or skill (process 4).  Key developments in children’s episodic 
foresight or metacognition between ages 5 and 6 likely support the emergence of these four 
processes required for future-directed learning. 
Episodic Foresight 
Episodic foresight, children’s capacity to envision personal future scenarios and regulate 
behaviour accordingly (Suddendorf, 2010; Suddendorf & Moore, 2011), supports processes 1 and 4.  
Episodic foresight first emerges during the preschool years and continues to develop through 
childhood and into adolescence (for a review, see Suddendorf and Redshaw, 2013).  Between ages 
3 to 5 years, children show rapid improvements in their ability to accurately predict and discuss 
future events when prompted by adults (e.g., Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne, Gross, 
McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011).  However, at this age, children’s ability to spontaneously 
consider and flexibly prepare for the future is limited.  For example, young children struggle to 
anticipate future needs and desires that conflict with current ones (e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; 
Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014).  Furthermore, recent research shows that children’s ability 
to spontaneously generate future mental scenarios and imbue these scenarios with rich contextual 
details increases gradually over middle childhood (Coughlin, Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Coughlin, 
Robins, & Ghetti, 2017), suggesting preschoolers’ predictions of the future may still be heavily 
reliant on learned scripts.  These developments in episodic foresight beyond the preschool years are 
crucial for the emergence of deliberate practice and help explain the pattern of results observed in 
this thesis. 
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In Chapter 2, we found that 4- and 5-year-olds failed to apply a selective learning strategy 
when they were only given one trial of the information seeking task.  The aim of giving children 
only a single trial was to ensure that they needed to think ahead about which information would be 
needed for the future test instead of learning to attend to the future-relevant information through 
trial-and-error.  Our finding was in contrast to that of Woody-Ramsey and Miller’s (1988) study, 
which found that children as young as 4 years learned over trials to apply a selective learning 
strategy to acquire information for a future test when specifically told which information to learn.  
Our task’s increased reliance on episodic foresight compared to Woody-Ramsey and Miller’s task 
suggests that 4- and 5-year-olds may have failed because they either were not envisioning the future 
test when making decisions about which information to learn (process 1) or did not successfully 
regulate their behaviour in line with their forecasts (process 4).  Chapter 2’s study, however, did not 
determine which of these processes the younger children were more likely to struggle with.  In 
Chapter 3, we specifically asked children why they had made the decision to play with a particular 
game during the free play time.  This study showed that, unlike the older children, most 4- and 5-
year-olds did not mention the future test as a motivating factor.  While this finding is not sufficient 
evidence that 4- and 5-year-olds were not thinking about the future (process 1), it does show that, at 
the very least, their behaviour was not motivated by it (process 4).  Finally, the findings of Chapter 
4 provide direct empirical support for the role of episodic foresight in deliberate practice and 
suggest that children’s ability to self-motivate future-directed behaviour (process 4) may continue 
to increase through middle childhood, supported perhaps by improvements in the episodic vividness 
of their forecasts (process 1).   
Much of the focus of research on the development of episodic foresight in childhood has 
been on its emergence during the preschool years.  While the preschool years are clearly a time of 
critical developments in episodic foresight and the cognitive capacities that support it (for a review, 
see Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013), the very basic ability to predict and prepare for the near future 
that is displayed by preschoolers is a long way from adults’ capacity to flexibly prepare for a 
multitude of distant future scenarios.  Only a small number of studies have examined the continued 
development of episodic foresight through middle childhood and adolescence (e.g., Coughlin, 
Lyons, & Ghetti, 2014; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014).  The current thesis thus presents 
some of the first studies examining age-related developments in children’s future-directed 
behaviour beyond the preschool years.  The findings demonstrate clear improvements in children’s 
episodic foresight during the early primary school years that have significant implications for their 
academic achievement.  This work highlights the importance of further research to address the large 
gap in our understanding of how children develop a flexible foresight capacity that allows them to 
pursue long-term learning goals independently. 
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One notable gap in our understanding concerns the consolidation of mixed findings of 
previous studies examining preschoolers’ episodic foresight.  In general, children as young as 4 
years old have shown competence on tasks in which they are prompted to consider the future by 
being forced to select an item or through questioning (e.g., Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Hayne, Gross, 
McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; Payne, Taylor, Hayne, & Scarf, 2014; Suddendorf, Nielsen, 
& von Gehlen, 2011).  However, recent studies show preschoolers perform rather poorly on tasks 
requiring them to self-generate future scenarios (Coughlin et al., 2014), spontaneously save for the 
future (Metcalf & Atance, 2011), and consider future desires that differ from current ones (Atance 
& Meltzoff, 2005; Kramer, Goldfarb, Tashjian, & Lagattuta, 2017; Mahy et al., 2014).  
Furthermore, the current findings are in line with studies reporting that children do not show 
competence on future planning tasks until age 5 years or older (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Coughlin 
et al., 2014; Dickerson, Ainge, & Seed, 2018; McColgan & McCormack, 2008).  These findings, 
together, suggest that children’s capacity to spontaneously prepare for the future—that is, in the 
absence of prompting provided by adults—may develop later than previously thought.  
Envisioning one’s own future feelings and desires is crucial for driving spontaneous future-
directed behaviour (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).  However, this may be 
one aspect of future thinking that young children have particular trouble with.  In the preschool and 
early primary school years, children’s prospections may still lack the vivid episodic imagery that is 
characteristic of adult prospections (Coughlin, Robins, & Ghetti, 2017) and which evokes emotion 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2005).  Therefore, while younger children may be able to understand and 
predict future emotions (Gautam, Bulley, von Hippel, & Suddendorf, 2017; Lagattuta, 2014), these 
predictions may be more reliant on learned scripts about how one should feel in particular future 
scenarios, rather than on a felt experience of emotion that can influence motivation and decision-
making.  Chapter 4’s finding that a prompt to focus on future feelings may have helped the 8- and 
9-year-olds, but not younger children, to overcome current desires and increase practice time 
provides further evidence that the capacity to envision future feelings may be relatively late 
developing.  The protracted development of this capacity may explain why young children tend to 
be more present-oriented and struggle to self-motivate future-directed behaviour.  These findings 
highlight the importance of considering affective and motivational aspects of tasks when studying 
children’s developing episodic foresight (see also Mahy et al., 2014).   
Metacognition 
Metacognition, one’s awareness and understanding of own’s cognitive capacities and 
process and the use of this knowledge to monitor and regulate cognition (Flavell, 1979), supports 
processes 2, 3 and 4 involved in future-directed learning.  The early primary school years appear to 
be a time of particularly important developments in children’s understanding of learning processes 
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and strategies (processes 3 and 4).  For example, after interviewing children about their 
understanding of learning, Pramling (1986) concluded that only from age 6 years do children 
understand that they play an active role in their own learning and can deliberately rehearse a 
behaviour to learn it.  Children younger than 6 in Pramling’s study tended to view learning as a 
passive process; something that occurred with the natural passage of time.  In a similar but more 
recent study, Sobel and Letourneau (2015) also found that children’s ability to accurately reflect on 
their own learning undergoes significant developments between ages 4 to 8 years.  The researchers 
found that while most of the 4- and 5-year-olds failed to accurately explain what learning was and 
how it occurs, almost all 8- to 10-year-olds showed an understanding of learning as an active 
process and were more likely to be able to report using learning strategies.   
In Chapter 3, I assessed children’s understanding of deliberate practice by asking them to, 
firstly, report a strategy that would help them improve a skill and, secondly, explain what practice 
involved.  My findings demonstrated that most children have acquired this basic understanding of 
deliberate practice by age 5.  The 5-year-olds also showed some early evidence of engagement in 
deliberate practice; they spent more time playing their target game, but most 5-year-olds did not 
offer practice as the reason for doing so.  The majority of 6- and 7-year-olds, however, both 
understood deliberate practice and reported practising for the future.  These findings align with 
previous studies in suggesting that, while 5-year-olds are starting to become more aware of learning 
and learning processes (process 3), it is not until age 6 that most children understand that they are 
the agents that drive the process of learning (process 4)—an understanding that is essential to 
engage in deliberate practice.  This finding of a developmental delay between the age at which 
children seem to understand the role of practice in skill acquisition and the age at which they 
actually start to employ it is similar to other contexts in which there are age-related dissociations 
between children’s understanding and their behaviour (e.g., Lyon & Flavell, 1994; Zelazo, Frye, & 
Rapus, 1996), and reiterates the importance of examining children’s verbal responses in context 
with their behaviour. 
Previous studies suggest that young children may be able to monitor learning that involves 
changes in behaviour before they can monitor and remember learning involving changes in factual 
knowledge (e.g., Bartsch, Horvath, & Estes, 2003; Esbensen, Taylor, & Stoess, 1997; Pramling, 
1988).  In the current thesis, I assessed, for the first time, children’s capacity to deliberately acquire 
both information and skills for a future event and found that engagement in these two behaviours 
emerge around the same age.  This finding supports the theory that the capacity to learn for the 
future is a complex process involving sophisticated underlying cognitive capacities.  While the 
capacity to monitor learning may be critical to deliberate learning for the future, it is not sufficient.  
This finding also suggests that by the time future-directed learning has emerged at age 6, children 
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may be able to monitor learning of both factual information and skills with reasonable accuracy 
(process 2).  To develop a full picture of the differences and similarities between the development 
of information seeking and deliberate practice, additional studies will be needed that test children 
on a battery of measures examining their understanding of and engagement in both behaviours, as 
well as their episodic foresight and metacognition. 
The similarities between future-directed information seeking and deliberate practice and 
their emergence around the same time in development suggests that the metacognitive processes 
underlying children’s skill acquisition warrants further investigation.  Currently, the vast majority 
of literature on the development of metacognition focuses on its role in memory, comprehension, 
and the acquisition of knowledge (for a review, see Lyons, 2010), and considerably less is known 
about the role that metacognition plays in skill acquisition.  A large gap in our understanding, 
therefore, concerns children’s understanding and application of strategies to learn skills and 
behaviours.  The current thesis makes some headway at exploring children’s deliberate skill 
acquisition and how this might relate to their deliberate information seeking; however, the extent to 
which the metacognitive processes underlying these two behaviours are similar is, as yet, unclear.  
Further research into the metacognitive processes underlying skill acquisition may provide a more 
nuanced understanding of metacognitive development. 
The Role of Schooling 
Finally, it is important to note that formal schooling is likely to influence the emergence and 
early development of future-directed learning.  Previous research has found, for example, that 
schooling strongly impacts metacognitive development, both through direct instruction of learning 
strategies and through attitudes and beliefs surrounding learning (for a review, see Kurtz, 1990).  
For example, Coffman, Ornstein, McCall, and Curran (2008) found that first graders exposed to 
more memory-relevant language from their teachers demonstrated greater strategic knowledge and 
exhibited more sophisticated strategy use by the end of their first year of school than children 
exposed to less memory-relevant language.  Children’s metacognition is therefore likely to improve 
considerably even in the first year of formal schooling. 
In Australia, most children start primary school in the year they turn 5 or 6 years old, first 
attending a preparatory year before commencing more formalised education (Year 1) the following 
year.  It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the age at which our participants were first starting 
school is the same age at which we saw them start to deliberately learn information and skills in 
preparation for a future event.  Of the participants in the first two studies, approximately one quarter 
of the 5-year-olds had not yet started school and three-quarters were enrolled in Prep (preparatory 
year), whereas all 6-year-olds had started school and more than two thirds were enrolled in Year 1.  
The 5-year-olds had attended school for an average of only 4 months, while the 6-year-olds had 
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attended for an average of 15 months.  This difference in exposure to schooling may explain the 
differences in learning behaviours observed between 5 and 6-year-olds in Study 1 and Study 2.  The 
6-year-olds would have likely had greater experience with tasks requiring them to learn information 
and skills for specific purposes than the 5-year-olds, such as being asked regularly by teachers to 
recall information from memory (Coffman et al., 2008).  This experience is likely to result in 
greater awareness of learning strategies, such as rehearsal.  A direct examination of the impact of 
schooling was, however, beyond the scope of this thesis and further research is needed.   
Implications, Limitations and Future Directions 
This thesis provides important insights into the earliest emergence of children’s basic 
capacity to learn in preparation for a future event, in particular, how children come to be 
independent learners.  Given that the three studies included in this thesis represent some of the first 
studies to examine children’s spontaneous learning for the future, my tasks utilised only short 
delays between informing children of the future event, presenting them with an opportunity to study 
or practice, and presenting them with the future event itself.  Each study was situated in a lab 
environment, and executive demands of the tasks were significantly reduced.  While informative for 
examining children’s earliest capacities, findings from these studies may not reflect children’s 
capacity to learn for the future in real-world scenarios in which there may be long delays before 
information or skills need to be acquired, opportunities to rehearse may not be obvious to children, 
and more influential distractions may be present.  A natural progression of this work, therefore, is to 
examine young children’s capacity to learn for real-world future scenarios outside the lab, where 
goals may be further in the future or where children are required to sustain learning over extended 
periods.   
This thesis informs our theoretical understanding of the underlying cognitive capacities that 
support children’s future-oriented information seeking and deliberate practice and has important 
practical implications for supporting children’s self-regulated learning and academic achievement.  
The final study, for example, showed that prompting children to forge an empathetic connection 
with their future self can increase the time they spend practising in preparation for a future event, at 
least for children aged 8 and older.  While it is a commonly expressed frustration among parents 
that encouraging children to study and practice can be difficult, this finding suggests that motivating 
children to learn for the future may be as simple as prompting them to reflect on their future 
feelings.  An interesting question for future research to examine is whether regularly encouraging 
this reflection in children from a young age may increase their intrinsic motivation to learn new 
information and skills for the future, something that would give children an obvious academic 
advantage.  The finding that an affective prompt did not influence the 6- and 7-year-olds’ practice 
time demonstrated that the development of the underlying capacities influences the efficacy of 
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methods we may use to motivate children’s deliberate practice.  A natural progression of this work 
would be to more closely examine the potential age-related differences in the episodic and affective 
content of 6- to 9-year-olds’ forecasts.  A further study could examine whether providing children 
with a second trial, giving them the opportunity to experience the affective consequences of their 
decisions during the first trial, would increase the effect of affective forecasting for the younger 
children.   
The precise role of social factors, such as schooling, is another intriguing open question 
which should be explored in further research.  It would be interesting, for example, to examine the 
development of future-directed learning in communities in which formal schooling is not prevalent.  
Future research could also investigate whether engagement in structured extra-curricular activities, 
such as sport and music lessons, influences children’s future-directed learning.  A better 
understanding of how children develop the capacity to learn with the future in mind and the 
cognitive capacities and social factors that support this development is vital for attempts to foster 
this ability from a young age.   
Finally, this thesis examined the age-related differences in children’s capacity to learn for 
the future.  However, even within age groups, children appeared to differ considerably in their 
motivation to learn for the future.  Therefore, the consideration of individual differences in 
children’s capacity and motivation to learn for the future may also be useful for establishing 
targeted interventions aimed at improving children’s future-directed learning and, in turn, academic 
outcomes.  Given the role of affective forecasting and the impact bias in driving future-directed 
behaviour (Miloyan & Suddendorf, 2015) (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), an interesting open question, 
for example, is whether children differ in the extent to which they consider and exaggerate the 
emotional impact of future events, as adults have been found to do (e.g., Dunn, Brackett, Ashton-
James, Schneiderman, & Salovey, 2007).  A prompt to consider future feelings may, for example, 
be most beneficial for children who might not spontaneously do so. 
Conclusion 
Developing the capacity to deliberately acquire information and skills in preparation for the 
future has vast implications for children’s self-regulated learning and academic achievement.  The 
current thesis is the first comprehensive investigation of young children’s emerging capacity to self-
initiate learning with the future in mind, and the findings reported here shed light on the age at 
which children start to selectively learn information and skills in preparation for a future event 
without prompting.  This thesis makes important headway at examining the development of more 
spontaneous forms of future-directed behaviours in young children, addressing a crucial gap in our 
understanding of the development of episodic foresight.  Furthermore, this work contributes to the 
existing theory on the role of episodic foresight in driving future-directed behaviour by providing 
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the first empirical evidence that affective forecasting can motivate children’s deliberate practice and 
highlights the importance of considering affective elements in episodic foresight paradigms.  The 
insights gained from this body of research are likely to be of particular relevance to caregivers and 
educators looking for a better understanding of how children become independent learners and for 
ways to foster their self-regulated learning.  This thesis lays the groundwork for much further 
research into this remarkable capacity that allows us to take charge of our own learning and to 
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Appendix B 
Experimenter Script for the Chapter 2 Study 
 
The set of cards children are introduced to first during the exposure phase and the set of cards that 
they are tested on during the test phase are counterbalanced across participants.  Where the script 
differs based on this counterbalancing, the alternate is shown in brackets. 
 
[Exposure Phase] This is Jamie the Giraffe.  Jamie’s favourite game is a guessing game.  He likes 
to try and guess what his friend’s favourite things are.  [To confirm children are not already 
familiar with the cards, the experimenter asks:] Have you seen these cards before?  These animals 
are Jamie’s friends.  Underneath these red [/blue] cards are pictures of each animal’s favourite toy 
[/food].  And underneath these blue [/red] cards are pictures of each animal’s favourite food [/toy].  
We are going to play a guessing game with Jamie to see if we can guess what the animals favourite 
things are.  [Placing the puppet behind the cards on the left side of the table] Jamie wants to start 
with the red [/blue] cards first.  What do you think the bird’s favourite toy is? [The experimenter 
waits for the child to respond, and then flips the card to show the correct answer.] The bird’s 
favourite toy is a teddy. [The experimenter moves through the remaining red/blue cards in the same 
manner.  Then, moving the puppet to sit behind the remaining set of cards.] Let’s move Jamie to 
this side and play with the blue [/red] cards.  What do you think the bird’s favourite food is? [The 
experimenter moves through the remaining set of cards in the same manner as the first set.].  
[Study Phase] Well, did you know, Jamie doesn’t like to play with the blue [/red] cards very much.  
Jamie only likes to play with the red [/blue] cards.  He doesn’t want to play with the blue [/red] 
cards anymore, so we won’t play with the blue [/red] cards again.  We are only going to play with 
the red [/blue] cards from now on. [If not already there, the experimenter moves the puppet behind 
the red cards.]. Before we play this game again, I’m going to turn over the sand timer and while the 
sand is going down, you can look under any of the cards you want.  [Turning over a card on the left 
of the barrier] You can look under this card if you want [turning over a card on the right of the 
barrier] and you can look under this card if you want.  You can look under any of the cards you 
want.  When the sand timer is finished, I’ll say ‘Stop!’ and then we’ll play the guessing game with 
Jamie with the red [/blue] cards again.  And, this time, for every animal’s favourite toy [/food] that 
you get right, you’ll get a sticker.  So if you get every red card right, you can have six stickers! 




Supplementary Results for Chapter 2 Study 
 
Table C1 
Means and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for Time (in secs) Spent Viewing Target and 
Distractor Cards for Each Age Group, and for Children Across all Age Groups who did and did not 





Average Number of Cards Recalled During the Test Phase for Children in Each Age Group, and 




 Target Cards Distractor Cards 
4-year-olds  31.00 (14.35) 20.48 (13.09) 
5-year-olds 31.19 (15.21) 21.27 (14.87) 
6-year-olds 39.21 (21.03) 14.79 (18.32) 
7-year-olds 46.93 (15.93) 11.14 (12.87) 
Evidence of Strategy Use 53.96 (14.22) 4.09 (8.97) 
No Evidence of Strategy Use 37.25 (17.92) 20.21 (14.92) 
       M      SD 
4-year-olds  2.15 1.63 
5-year-olds 3.30 1.30 
6-year-olds 4.79 1.50 
7-year-olds 5.03 1.12 
Evidence of Strategy Use 3.51 1.78 
No Evidence of Strategy Use 5.22 1.20 
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Appendix D 
Children’s Average Playing Time of Games in Chapter 3 Study 
 
Table D1 
Mean Percentage of Time Spent Playing With Games When it was Children’s Target Game and 
When it was not Children’s Target Game (SDs in parentheses)  
 4-year-olds 5-year-olds 6-year-olds 7-year-olds 
Game Target Other Target Other Target Other Target Other 
Experiment 1 










(20.76) - - 










(9.75) - - 










(24.71) - - 










(28.31) - - 






































































Sample Size Decision in Chapter 4 Study 
 
We designed this study to have power of .95 to detect a medium effect (f2 = .15) with an α of 
.05.  This required a minimum sample size of 118 children.  Emails were sent to parents on the 
database with children in the desired age range with the aim of recruiting this many participants 
based on past response rates.  Recruitment emails stopped being sent once the minimum required 
sample size had been reached.  A preliminary analysis was conducted for purposes of a presentation 
of preliminary data; however, no decision to stop or continue collecting data was based on this 
analysis.  Due to higher than predicted interest in the study and parents having more than one child 
within this age range, the final sample size recruited was 151 children which gave a power of .98 to 
detect a medium effect (f2 = .15) with an α of .05. 
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Appendix F 
Experimenter Scripts for the Neutral and Emotion Conditions in Chapter 4 Study 
 
For children whose target game is quoits: 
Neutral Condition   
Okay, before I leave you alone to play in this room, I would like you to close your eyes and 
imagine something for me.  I want you to imagine that we have already played in this room for 5 
minutes and we are going back into the first room to have our test with the quoits game.  Remember 
how you told me you wanted to win ___(the number of successes the child said they desired) 
stickers?  Well I want you to imagine yourself playing the game and getting the hoop on the stick 
___(the number of successes the child said they desired) times before all the sand runs out of the 
timer and so you win those stickers.  Now I want you to imagine how you would play the game to 
be as good as you wanted to be.  Now imagine that the sand timer has finished and you get to pick 
out a sticker for each time you got the hoop on the stick.  Are you imagining that?  Can you tell me 
what you thinking about?  Are you thinking about how to play the game to win the stickers?   
Emotion Condition 
Okay, before I leave you alone to play in this room, I would like you to close your eyes and 
imagine something for me.  I want you to imagine that we have already played in this room for 5 
minutes and we are going back into the first room to have our test with the quoits game.  Remember 
how you told me you wanted to win ___(the number of successes the child said they desired) 
stickers?  Well I want you to imagine yourself playing the game and you get the hoop on the sticks 
___(the number of successes the child said they desired) before all the sand runs out of the timer 
and so you win ___(the number of successes the child said they desired) stickers.  Now I want you 
to imagine how you would feel if you were as good at the game as you wanted to be.  Imagine how 
you would feel if you got all the stickers you wanted to take home with you.  Are you imagining 
how you would feel about that?  Can you tell me what emotions you would feel?  Are you feeling 
those emotions now when you think about playing the game? 
